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Social Media and the Vanishing
Points of Ethical and
Constitutional Boundaries
Ken Strutin*
Abstract
Social media are extraordinary communication and
preservation tools brimming with fonts of incriminating,
exculpating, and impeaching evidence. Legal professionals
have already added online profiles, instant messaging, and
videos to the list of information sources about their clients,
their opponents, and their potential witnesses. Still, the bulk of
legal authority and ethical guidance is rooted in precedent
based on antecedent technologies, which has little resemblance
to the emerging social centers of cyberspace. No guidelines for
criminal defense discovery or investigation within networked
social spaces can be found in existing statutes and ethics codes.
One ethics committee has taken the lead on this issue in an
opinion curtailing the limits of surreptitious witness
investigation through Facebook. Defense counsel‟s duty to
zealously and effectively represent their clients, the practical
desire to avoid being sued for malpractice, and the promotion of
the fair administration of justice all require a clear
demarcation of the ethical and constitutional boundaries for
accessing and using data from social networking sites. This
Article will examine the dual nature of social media as a
communication conduit and information warehouse, the
meaning of privacy in this environment, and the ethical and
legal dilemmas inherent in prosecuting and defending cases
with this new breed of evidence.

* Director of Legal Information Services, New York State Defenders
Association. J.D., Temple University School of Law, 1984; M.L.S. St. John‟s
University, 1994; B.A., summa cum laude, St. John‟s University, 1981.
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Introduction
Our brick and mortar world is receding into a virtual
landscape. There is an online realm where hundreds of millions
of people are conversing, networking, and logging the details of
their lives. This new mode of human interaction does not fit
neatly into any discovery statutes, case law precedents, or
ethics codes. Indeed, the administration of justice is struggling
to adapt to this emergent reality with little guidance. The
social networking era, marked by the creation of instant
communities and depots of personal information, is pushing
legal practice towards the vanishing points for ethical and
constitutional boundaries.
The virtual socialscape exists at right angles to the
physical world, and so our perceptions must bend accordingly.
In the first decade of this new century, people became
accustomed to recording increasingly larger amounts of data
about their lives and activities. Five hundred million Facebook
users can‟t be wrong.1 The creation and development of social
media seems to satisfy a very deep biological need.2 Another
1. WILLIE RASKIN, BILLY ROSE, & FRED FISHER, FIFTY MILLION
FRENCHMEN (1927); See Scott Duke Harris, Facebook Milestone: 500 Million
Members; on to 1 Billion?, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July 21, 2010, available
at http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_ 15568209?nclick_check=1 (“If Facebook
gallops ahead at its current pace, the 1 billion mark would indeed be reached
in 2011. The online social network Mark Zuckerberg and a few Harvard
classmates founded in 2004 went from zero to 250 million users in five
years—and doubled that number over the past 12 months despite controversy
regarding its privacy protocols.”). Cecilia Kang, Facebook to Hit 500 Million
Users, But Meteoric Rise Has Come With Growing Pains, WASH. POST BLOG
(July
19,
2010,
5:00
PM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2010/07/facebook_hits_500_million
_user.html (“The Silicon Valley Web site is now the biggest online trust of our
vacation photos, electronic rolodexes, and recordings of how we felt about
President Obama‟s candidacy for president, the ban on headscarves in France
and the Lindsay Lohan‟s rollercoaster ride with sobriety. Seventy percent of
users are outside the U.S., and one-quarter of all users are checking in and
updating their pages from their cell phones.”).
2. The explosive growth of social media is due to advances in technology,
but its driving force might have originated in the depths of the mirror neuron
response, i.e., the need to imitate. See Sandra Blakeslee, Cells that Read
Minds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2006 (“The human brain has multiple mirror
neuron systems that specialize in carrying out and understanding not just
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important indicator of this subtle migration has been the
growth of personal computer hard drives from megabytes to
terabytes.3 The amount of information people collect about
their own lives, combined with the data scattered through
countless government and commercial databases, are filling
citizen libraries.4 And the volume of information being

the actions of others but their intentions, the social meaning of their behavior
and their emotions.”); Shankar Vedantam, How Brain‟s „Mirrors‟ Aid Our
Social Understanding, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2006, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/09/24/AR2006092400718.html (“Three new studies
published independently last week in the journal Current Biology have
yielded new insights into „mirror neurons‟ and point the way to two intriguing
conclusions: The mirror system seems to be involved in the human capacity
for language, and people with stronger mirror neuron responses to sounds
seem to also have a larger capacity for empathy, suggesting the mirror
system is part of the brain mechanisms that produce altruistic behavior.”);
Use of Social Media in Fashion Industry, THE VEDA BLOG (Mar. 16, 2010),
http://www.vedainformatics.com/blogs/use-of-social-media-in-fashionindustry/ (“Recent research on social media indicates that there may be
biological mechanisms that influence individuals who are active in the world
of social media. This brain-to-brain link where one person‟s opinion,
movement or behavior influenced the brain cells of others through
interpersonal orchestration is known as mirror neurons.”).
3. See Michael Kanellos, Here Comes the Terabyte Hard Drive, CNET
NEWS (Jan. 4, 2007), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1041_3-6147409.html (“A
terabyte is a trillion bytes, or a million megabytes, or 1,000 gigabytes, as
measured by the hard-drive industry. (There are actually two conventions for
calculating megabytes, but this is how the drive industry counts it.) As a
reference, the print collection in the Library of Congress comes to about 10
terabytes of information, according to the How Much Information study from
U.C. Berkeley. The report also found that 400,000 terabytes of e-mail get
produced per year. About 50,000 trees would be necessary to create enough
paper to hold a terabyte of information, according to the report. Who needs
this sort of storage capacity? You will, eventually, said Doug Pickford,
director of market and product strategy at Hitachi. Demand for data storage
capacity at corporations continues to grow, and it shows no sign of abating. A
single terabyte drive takes up less space than four 250GB drives, which lets
IT managers conserve on computing room real estate. The drive can hold
about 330,000 3MB photos or 250,000 MP3s, according to Hitachi's math.”).
4. No doubt “citizen libraries” chronicling the lives of ordinary people
will soon rival the bulk of Presidential Libraries. Compare PETER LYMAN &
HAL R. VARIAN, HOW MUCH INFORMATION? 2003, at 2 (2003),
http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-info2003/printable_report.pdf (“According to the Population Reference Bureau,
the world population is 6.3 billion, thus almost 800 MB of recorded
information is produced per person each year. It would take about 30 feet of
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consumed far outstrips the amount being stored.5
Profiles, tweets, and YouTube videos are the equivalent of
pyramid building, an effort by individuals to defeat time and
overcome their mortality by preserving a colossal monument to
their lives, albeit measured in gigabytes instead of cubits. The
data from this life logging6 is creating a form of “microcelebrity,”7 memorializing actions and thoughts for
indeterminate time periods and creating buzz for forums where

books to store the equivalent of 800 MB of information on paper.”), with
About the Library, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/about/facts.html
(last visited Aug. 26, 2010) (“Twelve Presidential Libraries maintain over 400
million pages of textual materials; nearly ten million photographs; over 15
million feet (5,000 km) of motion picture film; nearly 100,000 hours of disc,
audiotape, and videotape recordings; and approximately half a million
museum objects.”).
5. See ROGER E. BOHN & JAMES E. SHORT, HOW MUCH INFORMATION? 2009
REPORT
ON
AMERICAN
CONSUMERS
14
(2009),
http://hmi.ucsd.edu/pdf/HMI_2009_ConsumerReport_Dec9_2009.pdf
(“According to some estimates, the total amount of hard disk storage
worldwide at the end of 2008 was roughly 200 exabytes. In other words, the
3.6 zettabytes of information used by Americans in their homes during 2008
was roughly 20 times more than what could be stored at one time on all the
hard drives in the world.”).
6. See generally Gary Wolf, The Data-Driven Life, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26,
2010 (“One of the reasons that self-tracking is spreading widely beyond the
technical culture that gave birth to it is that we all have at least an inkling of
what‟s going on out there in the cloud. Our search history, friend networks
and status updates allow us to be analyzed by machines in ways we can‟t
always anticipate or control. It‟s natural that we would want to reclaim some
of this power: to look outward to the cloud, as well as inward toward the
psyche, in our quest to figure ourselves out.”); Life-Logging and the
Generation Gap over Privacy (NPR Radio Feb. 14, 2007) (“Daily
documentation has become routine as the tech-savvy [] connect with
everyone, anyone, anytime. . . . Guests on the program talk[] about „lifelogging,‟ a system that documents every conversation, movement, and idea
through a series of recording gadgets like GPS trackers and even brain
scanners.”)
7. See Clive Thompson, Clive Thompson on the Age of Microcelebrity:
Why Everyone‟s a Little Brad Pitt, WIRED MAG., Nov. 27, 2007, available at
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/people/magazine/15-12/st_thompson
(“Microcelebrity is the phenomenon of being extremely well known not to
millions but to a small group—a thousand people, or maybe only a few dozen.
As [Do It Yourself] media reach ever deeper into our lives, it's happening to
more and more of us. Got a Facebook account? A whackload of pictures on
Flickr? Odds are there are complete strangers who know about you—and
maybe even talk about you.”).
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“microfans” know and debate the intimate details of strangers
outside the pale of news media. Additionally, the virtual
socialscape is more than information creation and storage; it
The
encompasses
communication
and
interaction.8
administration of justice, the investigation of crimes, and the
defense of the accused are being changed at the intersections
with this virtual world.
This Article will examine the current state of social media,
the cross-sections and currents that bring its users into the
legal realm, and the existing laws and ethical rules that are
guiding attorney conduct. Law and technology tend to develop
along parallel lines. The principles and foundations of the legal
system are over-layered by changes in society and electronic
information sharing. It appears that social media and Internet
behavior are leading the drive towards change.9 Although there
are no bodies of statutes and precedent to offer leadership in
this area, the necessity of legal processes has already begun to
bring some order to the untamed continent inhabited by
Facebook, MySpace, YouTube, and Twitter.
In Part I, the panorama of online communities, which have
inspired hundreds of millions to create profiles and publish the

8. The will to communicate, the need to express the details of our lives so
that others can consume them, extends back to the dawn of consciousness.
See Prakash Chakravarthi, The History of Communications from Cave
Drawings to Mail Messages, IEES AES MAG., Apr. 1992, at 30 (“Crude
drawings on rock and cave walls are the earliest methods of communication
which we know. Though it was cumbersome and slow it helped to convey
ideas and past events to other people.”).
9. See generally Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network
Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship, J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM.
(Oct. 2007), http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/issue1/boyd.ellison.html (“The rise
of SNSs indicates a shift in the organization of online communities. While
websites dedicated to communities of interest still exist and prosper, SNSs
are primarily organized around people, not interests. Early public online
communities such as Usenet and public discussion forums were structured by
topics or according to topical hierarchies, but social network sites are
structured as personal (or „egocentric‟) networks, with the individual at the
center of their own community. This more accurately mirrors unmediated
social structures, where „the world is composed of networks, not groups.‟ The
introduction of SNS features has introduced a new organizational framework
for online communities, and with it, a vibrant new research context.”)
(internal citation omitted).
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unguarded moments of their personal existence for global
audiences, will be explored. The definition of privacy and the
meaning of access in online social centers will be examined in
Part II. Part III will discuss the current methods of electronic
discovery and their broadening applications to social media.
Parts IV and V will analyze the importance of preserving social
networking evidence both as an obligation for the prosecution
and a necessity for the defense. Undercover investigation,
pretexting online, and the ethical fallout of such practices in
the socialscapes of Facebook and MySpace are reviewed in Part
VI.
The parallel processes of traditional legal procedures and
the line of technology that has revolutionized communication
and information practices will be viewed through several
notable legal developments. Facebook and MySpace have
already come to play an incipient role in acquiring jurisdiction
and initiating litigation in civil and criminal proceedings.
These sites have provided law enforcement with information
for arrest and search warrants, and laid the foundation for
indictments, and in some cases convictions. On the civil side,
courts have approved service of process through a defendant‟s
online profile. In both arenas, the contents of online profiles
and instant messages have played an important role as
evidence at trial. But this is only the beginning. These media
will eventually become a routine part of serving warrants and
complaints, boilerplate discovery requests, evidence in all
manner of proceedings, and ultimately, newly discovered
evidence for post-conviction motions. For the criminal
defendant, social media content might prove to be the DNA of
newly discovered exonerating evidence.
I. Social Media, Social Networking, and Every Tweet in
Between!
Social Networking provides a different avenue for familiar
patterns of human behavior and public concern. For instance,
“flash mobs,” which are groups of young people connected by
instant messaging alerts or e-vites, join in spontaneous
activities. Since these “flash mobs” have led to some public
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disturbances, they are now the object of law enforcement
surveillance.10 People in prison or on the run are also using
Facebook and similar outlets.11 The professional conduct of
attorneys, prosecutors,12 judges,13 as well as the behavior of
clients,14 witnesses, and jurors15 have all been touched by social
media.
Depending on the perspective, social networking can
complicate legal practice and due process in different ways.
Criminal defense counsel have a constitutional obligation to
effectively represent their clients and fully investigate their
cases. Both civil and criminal practitioners face legal liability
and ethical imperatives in handling the representation of a
client.
The measure of professional competence in a society that
interacts virtually necessitates asking questions such as: what
Social Networking Sites (SNS) are people using to
communicate and store information and how are they being
utilized?16 Will the information found on Social Networking
10. See Debra Cassens Weiss, FBI to Monitor Social Media to Fight
„Flash Mobs‟ of Roving Teens, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 25, 2010, 7:36 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/fbi_to_monitor_social_media_to_fight
_flash_mobs_of_roving_teens.
11. See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Escaped Convict Captured After
Telling of His Exploits on Facebook, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 25, 2010, 10:58 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/escaped_convict_captured_after_telli
ng_of_his_exploits_on_facebook/; Meg Handley, How Prisoners Harass Their
Victims
Using
Facebook,
TIME.COM
(Feb.
18,
2010),
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1964916,00.html.
12. See, e.g., Rochelle Olson, Hennepin County Prosecutor Accused of
Anti-Somali Posting on Facebook, STAR TRIBUNE, Feb. 17, 2010, available at
http://www.startribune.com/local/84525452.html?page=1&c=y.
13. See generally Ken Strutin, Pitfalls of Social Networking for Judges
and Attorneys, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 16, 2010, at 5 [hereinafter Pitfalls] (The author
discusses ethics opinions and disciplinary decisions demarcating the lines for
the behavior of judges and attorneys connecting through social media).
14. See Molly McDonough, First Thing Lawyer Tells New Clients: Shut
Down Facebook Account, A.B.A. J., Feb. 9, 2010, available at
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/first_thing_lawyer_tells_new_clients
_shut_down_facebook_account.
15. See generally Ken Strutin, Juror Behavior in the Information Age,
LLRX.COM (Dec. 26, 2010), http://www.llrx.com/features/jurorbehavior.htm.
16. See, e.g., Michael Liedtke, Twitter Quitters Outnumber Tweeters,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 5, 2009 (60% stopped using Twitter after a month);
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Sites be admissible?17 Are there any privacy protections or
barriers for materials stored on third-party sites?18 Since
almost everyone else is already using them—for example
clients, witnesses, and jurors—digital contents are coming in as
evidence of guilt, impeachment, and innocence. Therefore,
knowledge and understanding of technology will help in
investigation, discovery, and jury pool and venue challenges. A
lawyer‟s professional responsibility ought to include staying
abreast of this changing virtual environment.19
Defense counsel need to have the same level of knowledge
about social networking that is required to intelligently handle
forensic evidence, i.e., some basic understanding of the
principles and mechanics of its operation.20 The more detailed
Teddy Wayne, Social Networking Eclipses E-mail, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2009,
at
B3,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/18/technology/internet/18drill.html;
Dave
Rosenberg, Twitters and Blogs: Post Once and Bail Out, CNET NEWS (June 9,
2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13846_3-10260753-62.html (10% of users
responsible for over 90% of tweets).
17. See, e.g., Law School Hosts Panel on „Social Media as Evidence‟, UC
DAVIS
SCH.
L.
(Feb.
5,
2010),
http://www.law.ucdavis.edu/news/news.aspx?id=2525 (“Now, thanks to
Twitter, Facebook, text messaging and social media, a permanent record of
the exact words exchanged often exists. This material can be introduced in
court, complete with a time stamp showing when it happened.”).
18. See, e.g., Pete Cashmore, Why Facebook‟s Privacy War Is Not Over,
CNN.COM
(May
27,
2010,
4:16
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/social.media/05/27/facebook.privacy.war.cas
hmore/index.html (“If Facebook‟s mission is to build a „more open and
connected world‟ in which users „share more,‟ doesn‟t this contradict the
desire of some users to keep their information private?”).
19. Cf. The TJ Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (“Indeed in most
cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never
its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new
and available devices. It never may set its own tests, however persuasive be
its usages. Courts must in the end say what is required; there are
precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse
their omission.”); Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589, 593 (Cal. 1975) (An attorney‟s
competence best measured by “such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers
of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the
performance of the tasks which they undertake.”).
20. See generally Debbie Ginsberg & Meg Kribble, The Social
Networking Titans: Facebook and MySpace, LLRX.COM (Apr. 4, 2008),
http://www.llrx.com/features/facebookmyspace.htm; Dave Roos, How Social
Networks
Work,
HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM,
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and nuanced issues will fall within the purview of expert or
investigative assistance.21 For example, computer forensics can
uncover evidence found in digital storage media, sociologists
can explain online behavior, and linguists can interpret the
codes and subtly of chat and profile postings.22
The social media phenomenon is part of Web 2.0, i.e., the
shifting of content from top-down publishing to user- and
consumer-generated information; in other words, people
powered publishing.23 Social networking is a fast growing
segment of this media. In essence, SNSs are “web-based
http://communication.howstuffworks.com/how-social-networks-work.htm (last
visited July 28, 2010).
21. See, e.g., Applied Discovery Introduces New E-Discovery Consulting
Service to Help Corporations Assess, Mitigate, and Manage Social Media
Risks,
PR
NEWSWIRE
(June
3,
2010,
8:00
AM),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/applied-discovery-introduces-newe-discovery-consulting-service-to-help-corporations-assess-mitigate-andmanage-social-media-risks-95499699.html.
22. See Ken Strutin, Internet Behavior and Expert Evidence, N.Y. L.J.,
Nov. 4, 2008, at 5 (“Web-based criminal cases bring judges and jurors into
contact with an enigmatic Internet culture. A clear understanding of cyberbehavior is crucial to assessing probable cause in a search warrant affidavit
or the merits of a defense at trial. And misconceptions about Internet
conduct, in some instances, may be explained or dispelled by expert
evidence.”); see, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Twitter Expert Will Testify
Against Courtney Love in Defamation Trial, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 5, 2011, 7:31 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/twitter_expert_will_testify_against_c
ourtney_love_in_defamation_trial/.
23. The need of members of a society to communicate, to extend their
personal narratives into cyberspace and assume new personae online may
have its origins in the beginnings of Western drama—when performances
evolved from communal rituals involving everyone into plays performed
exclusively by actors. According to one historian, more than 2,000 years ago,
the seeds of modern drama started with the exploration of “new dimensions
of experience” and the emergence of individual performers pretending to be
other people, and finally, the separation of the audience from the
performance where “one part of the community was addressing another part.”
See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE CREATORS: A HISTORY OF HEROES OF THE
IMAGINATION 207, 209 (1993). This fundamental transformation giving rise to
personal expression, or “microtheater,” is occurring anew online. See, e.g.,
John Carroll & David Cameron, Drama, Digital Pre-Text and Social Media,
14 RES. IN DRAMA EDUC. 295 (2009) (“The techniques used for the
development of the digital pre-text for this project are based on facilitatorgenerated online social networking and mobile media content. This approach
generates the students‟ examination of mistaken identity as a platform for a
classroom exploration of Shakespeare‟s Twelfth Night.”)
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services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semipublic profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of
other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view
and traverse their list of connections and those made by others
within the system.”24
The core ingredients of these sites are their individual user
profiles
(information
storage
and
publication)
and
communication tools:
While SNSs have implemented a wide
variety of technical features, their backbone
consists of visible profiles that display an
articulated list of Friends who are also users of
the system. Profiles are unique pages where one
can „type oneself into being.‟ After joining an
SNS, an individual is asked to fill out forms
containing a series of questions. The profile is
generated using the answers to these questions,
which typically include descriptors such as age,
location, interests, and an „about me‟ section.
Most sites also encourage users to upload a
profile photo. Some sites allow users to enhance
their profiles by adding multimedia content or
modifying their profile‟s look and feel. Others,
such as Facebook, allow users to add modules
(“Applications”) that enhance their profile.25
For purposes of the penal law, the value of a
communication/information source is measured by the need to
control access to it.26 Access to social media has been found to
be important enough to be blocked as a condition of
punishment. For example, Victor L, a juvenile delinquent and
acknowledged gang member, pled guilty to a weapons offense
24. See Boyd & Ellison, supra note 9.
25. Id. (citations omitted).
26. See generally Ken Strutin, No-Computer Sentencing, N.Y. L.J., Jan.
11, 2005, at 5 (discussing the limits of banning access to the Internet,
computers or even television as a condition of probation or post-release
supervision).
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in a California court.27 He was sentenced to probation, which
included interdicting access to MySpace.28 Specifically, the
terms of his probation limiting Internet usage stated: “The
Minor shall not access or participate in any Social Networking
Site, including but not limited to Myspace.com.”29 In a postconviction proceeding, he challenged the condition, as well as
several others, as vague and overbroad. However, the purpose
behind this particular restriction was to “limit Victor‟s access to
the Internet in ways designed to minimize the temptation to
contact his gang friends or to otherwise use the computer for
illegal purposes by requiring adult supervision whenever he
goes online.”30 Therefore, the condition survived constitutional
scrutiny, in contrast to other cases, with terms totally banning
Internet use or access, which did not.31
The case of Victor L spearheads the judicial recognition of
SNSs as communication media which can be monitored. Other
cases involving social media have focused on its impact as
27. In re Victor L., 182 Cal. App. 4th 902, 908 (1st Dist. 2010).
28. Id. at 909.
29. Id. at 923.
30. Id. at 926.
31. Courts seem to be split on the appropriateness of lifetime or
conditional Internet bans as a term of probation or supervised release.
Compare United States v. Heckman, 592 F.3d 400, 409 (3d Cir. 2010) (“We do
not hold that limited Internet bans of shorter duration can never be imposed
as conditions of supervised release for this type of conduct, but when placed
within the context of related precedents, the unconditional, lifetime ban
imposed by the District Court in this case is so broad and insufficiently
tailored as to constitute „plain error.‟ We thus hold that this ban involved a
„greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary.‟ 18 U.S.C. §
3583(d)(2).”) with United States v. Fortenberry, 350 F. App‟x 906, 911 (5th
Cir. 2009) (“Although we recognize the conditional ban on the internet usage
for a lifetime is a harsh condition of supervised release, we cannot say that
Fortenberry has demonstrated that imposition of the same was plainly
erroneous.”). See generally Robin Miller, Validity of Condition of Probation,
Supervised Release, or Parole Restricting Computer Use or Internet Access, 4
A.L.R.6TH 1 (2005); David Kravetz, U.S. Courts Split on Internet Bans, WIRED
MAG.
(Jan.
12,
2010),
available
at
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/01/courts-split-on-internet-bans/
(“[A]ppellate courts are all over the map when it comes to internet bans often
imposed on defendants, especially sex deviants, once they have served their
time. What‟s more, the courts appear to be accepting the internet as a basic
freedom to which convicts, even the worst of the worst, usually should not be
denied permanent access.”).
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evidence at trial, including its utilization during the
commission of a crime,32 creating a virtual crime scene,33 and
enhancing criminal sentences.34
II. The Illusion of Privacy
The tension in social networking investigations is in
drawing the line between public and private information. While

32. See, e.g., Hoover Police Capture Two Suspected Facebook Bandits,
MYFOXAL.COM
(July
31,
2009,
2:15
PM),
http://www.myfoxal.com/global/story.asp?s=10825881 (In Alabama, burglars
checked Facebook pages to see who was on vacation to lineup their targets);
Chris Matyszczyk, Facebook Break Leads to Burglary Suspect, CNET NEWS
(Sept. 17, 2009, 4:27 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-17852_3-1035611771.html (In Virginia, a burglar checked his Facebook page in the victim‟s
home during the break-in); MySpace Pics Lead to Burglary Bust, ABC-7.COM
(Aug. 3, 2009, 6:22 PM), http://www.abc-7.com/Global/story.asp?S=10840135
(Burglars in Florida posted pictures online in which they were posing with
the stolen goods). Notably, Louisiana has enacted a law punishing the
“[u]nlawful posting of criminal activity for notoriety and publicity.” LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:107.4(A) (“It shall be unlawful for a person who is either a
principal or accessory to a crime to obtain an image of the commission of the
crime using any camera, videotape, photo-optical, photo-electric, or any other
image recording device and to transfer that image obtained during the
commission of the crime by the use of a computer online service, Internet
service, or any other means of electronic communication, including but not
limited to a local bulletin board service, Internet chat room, electronic mail,
or online messaging service for the purpose of gaining notoriety, publicity, or
the attention of the public.”).
33. See, e.g., Barbie Nadeau & Christopher Dickey, Murder Most Wired,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 3, 2007, at 51 (The investigation into the murder of a British
college student in Italy wended its way through familiar social media such as
Skype phone calls, photos, stories appearing on Facebook profiles, and a
YouTube video); Nicholas Riccardi, Criminal Charge Filed in Libel Case, L.A.
TIMES,
Dec.
4,
2008,
at
A10,
available
at
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/dec/04/nation/na-craigslist-libel4 (During a
visitation dispute, a 40-year-old man allegedly posted comments about his
former girlfriend on Craigslist Rants and Raves Forum. The state of Colorado
charged him with criminal libel.).
34. See, e.g., Eric Tucker, Social Networking Puts the Bite on Defendants,
LAW.COM
(July
22,
2008),
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=120242314
5595 (DWI defendants involved in crashes that resulted in serious injuries or
death were disappointed to learn that pictures of themselves mocking or
flaunting their actions, posted on Facebook or MySpace, had been provided to
the court at sentencing.).
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the scope of privacy expectations are being debated and argued
in the courts, the public side of the online world is being
archived and retransmitted without limit. The privacy dilemma
lies at the center of a triangle formed by the private enclaves
envisioned in the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments; service
providers‟ terms of service agreements (TOS) and their
definitions of privacy; and the meaning of “reasonableness” as
expressed in the practices and habits of millions of online
users.
The Wayback Machine,35 which harvests much of the
public side of the Internet, is almost two petabytes of data in
size and growing at a rate of twenty terabytes per month.36 The
Library of Congress announced that it will be archiving all
public tweets since Twitter started operation in March 2006.37
The impetus behind Congress‟ effort was to gather legal blogs,
websites of candidates for national office, and websites of
Members of Congress and capture a snapshot of public life
expressed through tweets to the tune of 167 terabytes.
Presently, there are no legal or ethical38 constraints on public
35. About
the
Internet
Archive,
INTERNET
ARCHIVE,
http://www.archive.org/about/about.php (last visited Aug. 13, 2010) (“The
Internet Archive is a 501(c)(3) non-profit that was founded to build an
Internet library. Its purposes include offering permanent access for
researchers, historians, scholars, people with disabilities, and the general
public to historical collections that exist in digital format.”).
36. See
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
INTERNET
ARCHIVE,
http://www.archive.org/about/faqs.php (last visited Sept. 12, 2010) (“How
large is the Wayback Machine? The Internet Archive Wayback Machine
contains almost 2 petabytes of data and is currently growing at a rate of 20
terabytes per month. This eclipses the amount of text contained in the
world's largest libraries, including the Library of Congress.”).
37. Matt Raymond, How Tweet It Is!: Library Acquires Entire Twitter
Archive,
LIBR.
CONG.
BLOG
(Apr.
14,
2010),
http://blogs.loc.gov/loc/2010/04/how-tweet-it-is-library-acquires-entire-twitterarchive/.
38. See Oregon State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 2005-164
(2005),
http://www.osbar.org/_docs/ethics/2005-164.pdf
(“Accessing
an
adversary‟s public Web site is no different from reading a magazine article or
purchasing a book written by that adversary. Because the risks that Oregon
RPC 4.2 seeks to avoid are not implicated by such activities, no Oregon RPC
4.2 violation would arise from such electronic access. A lawyer who reads
information posted for general public consumption simply is not
communicating with the represented owner of the Web site.”).

13

2011] ETHICAL & CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARIES

241

web searching, which includes blogs or personal websites.
But how do privacy settings and terms of service affect the
expectation of privacy in social media? The existence of privacy
in social media is a key question under codes of ethics and
discovery rules. If the expectation is that online profiles are as
private as a person‟s home, desk drawer, or combination safe,
then pretexting by private parties becomes problematic.39
However, this protean media does not offer clarity in its
definitions of privacy,40 and those definitions change with
advances in technology and public outcry.41 Meanwhile, courts
and ethics committees are relying on subjective expectations to
define privacy in social space.42

39. See generally Douglas R. Richmond, Deceptive Lawyering, 74 U. CIN.
L. REV. 577 (2005); Ken Strutin, Pretexting, Legal Ethics and Social
Networking
Sites,
LLRX.COM
(Oct.
5,
2009),
http://www.llrx.com/features/pretexting.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2010)
(summarizing current case law and literature on pretexting).
40. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP,
RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET (2007), available at
http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb /dsolove/Future-of-Reputation/text.htm.
41. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Web Means the End of Forgetting, N.Y.
TIMES,
July
25,
2010
(Magazine),
at
MM30,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com /2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-t2.html (“All around
the world, political leaders, scholars and citizens are searching for responses
to the challenge of preserving control of our identities in a digital world that
never forgets. Are the most promising solutions going to be technological?
Legislative? Judicial? Ethical? A result of shifting social norms and cultural
expectations? Or some mix of the above?”); Mark Zuckerberg, From Facebook,
Answering Privacy Concerns With New Settings, WASH. POST, May 24, 2010,
at
A19,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010
/05/23/AR2010052303828.html (“We have heard the feedback. There needs to
be a simpler way to control your information. In the coming weeks, we will
add privacy controls that are much simpler to use. We will also give you an
easy way to turn off all third-party services.”); Cecilia Kang, Senate Online
Privacy Hearing to Draw FTC, FCC Chairs, Google, Apple and Facebook,
WASH.
POST
BLOG
(July
23,
2010,
11:40
AM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2010/07/the_senate_commerce_co
mmittees.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2010) (“Analysts said greater focus from
Congress on online privacy has led Web sites and online ad networks to move
toward self-regulation to fend off legislation. This self-regulation is aimed at
greater disclosure on Web sites that consumers are being tracked, and an
easy mechanism for opting out.”).
42. See
generally
SOCIAL
NETWORKING
PRIVACY,
http://epic.org/privacy/socialnet/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2010) (collection of

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/6

14

242

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:1

Social media are analogous to open mikes. However, the
unguarded remarks of millions who publish their thoughts,
criticisms, and gossip on personal profiles are made under an
assumed veil of privacy. The public privacy of social networking
has not yet been clearly assigned a specific level of First,
Fourth, or Fifth Amendment protections,43 nor has it been
given a place among the privileges in the Rules of Evidence.44
The security of information posted on third-party host sites is
defined by those sites, their terms of agreements, their privacy
settings, and most importantly the discretion of visitors who
can read, copy, and republish without limit. When e-mail gaffes
gained prominence, a rule of thumb emerged cautioning users
not put anything into an e-mail that they would not want to see
printed on the front page of the New York Times.45 No such
litigation and public debate about the problems and violations of consumer
expectations in online privacy).
43. See Susan W. Brenner, The Privacy Privilege: Law Enforcement,
Technology and the Constitution, 7 U. FLA. J. TECH. L. & POL‟Y 123, 191-92
(2002), available at http://grove.ufl.edu/~techlaw/vol7/issue2/brenner.pdf
(“The First Amendment protects the privacy of the identity and associates of
an individual; the Fourth Amendment protects the privacy of the activities of
an individual; and the Fifth Amendment protects the privacy of the thoughts
of an individual. The degree to which they protect these different privacy
interests has evolved significantly since Justices Brandeis and Warren wrote
in 1890. This evolution is directly attributable to the increased sophistication
and proliferation of technology. This evolution is also responsible for the shift
from the Olmstead holding to the Katz holding. When the decision was made
by [the] Olmstead Court, wiretaps were in their infancy and were therefore
an exceedingly uncommon event. By the time the decision was made by the
Katz Court, surveillance technology had become very sophisticated, due in
large part to advances made during World War II, and the ability of the
government to spy on the activities of people had become a matter of public
concern. In changing the focus of the privacy protections of the Fourth
Amendment from places to people, the Katz Court sought to create a more
dynamic standard, one that could be used to address the increasing
invasiveness made possible by technology.”).
44. Id. at 137 (“By the time the Twenty-First Century dawned,
cyberspace had become an important new venue for mankind's activities, licit
and illicit. The rise and proliferation of cybercrime raised new problems for
law enforcement, both with the enforcement of existing substantive laws
against conduct vectored through cyberspace and also in the gathering of
evidence without violating the existing privacy standards.”).
45. See
E-Mail
Etiquette,
JOB-HUNT.ORG,
http://www.jobhunt.org/onlinejobsearchguide/article_e-mail_etiquette.shtml (last visited
Sept. 20, 2010) (“Golden rule of e-mail - Don't put anything in an e-mail that
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common wisdom has arisen to chasten people from putting up
pictures and videos showing questionable judgment or criminal
behavior. In George Orwell‟s 1984, it was Big Brother that
carried the burden and expense of mass surveillance, but in
Web 2.0 surveillance starts from the ground up.46 The divide
between consumer privacy expectations in social networking
and the legal recognition of these interests might be informed
by the ongoing challenges to e-mail privacy.
Electronic mail is not the equivalent of traditional mail or
even a landline phone call. One author has likened e-mails to a
postcard47 and pointed out that the privacy expectations in this
format are declining. In his review of recent New York
decisions, he suggested that the perception of e-mail privacy
hinged on the degree of protections that the sender was willing
to take:
Courts ask, for instance, does a sender leave
his or her e-mail account “open” on a computer
for others to see or access? Courts also look to
whether the e-mail is sent or received via a
corporate system or through a personal account;
whether
the
computer
used
for
such
communication is owned by an employer or an
individual;
and
whether,
when
the
communication was transmitted, the computer at
issue was located in a company‟s office or at a
home?48

you wouldn't be comfortable having your Mother or your boss - or the person
you may be writing about - read on the front page of The New York Times or
The Wall Street Journal.”).
46. See Ken Strutin, Social Networking Evidence in a Self-Surveillance
Society, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 10, 2009, at 5 (describes the evolution of mass selfsurveillance and lifelogging prompted by social media technology and services
and the legal implications).
47. See Mark A. Berman, Expectations of Privacy in E-Mail
Communications, N.Y. L.J., July 6, 2010 (“E-mails should more properly be
viewed as a „postcard‟ or a conversation over a speakerphone, both open and
available to a passerby to hear or see, than like a private „confidential,‟
„sealed‟ letter.”).
48. Id.
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In addition to personal user habits, other factors include
the existence of passwords, encryption, or security measures
taken by the employer or individual. The prevalence of shared
access to accounts by couples, employees, or in other situations
where consent to use the e-mail or a waiver of permission to
view exists is an increasingly significant detail.49
E-mail, like social media, is hosted or transits through a
third party‟s site. The expectation of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment when e-mail contents are gleaned from an
Internet Service Provider is being hotly debated. In Warshak v.
United States,50 the government was investigating Steven
Warshak for wire fraud and money laundering. They obtained
two ex parte orders under the Stored Communications Act (18
U.S.C. § 2703) (“SCA”) to search plaintiff e-mails, including
those stored on the Yahoo service. After nearly a year, the
government notified Warshak about the orders. As a result,
Warshak sought an injunction barring the government from
any more ex parte e-mail searches or for using those e-mails for
any purpose without a search warrant. The District Court for
the Southern District of Ohio granted Warshak‟s motion for a
preliminary injunction in part, stating:
The United States is accordingly [enjoined],
pending final judgment on the merits of
Plaintiffs‟ claims, from seizing, pursuant to court
order under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), the contents of
any personal e-mail account maintained by an
Internet Service Provider in the name of any
resident of the Southern District of Ohio without
providing the relevant account holder or
subscriber prior notice and an opportunity to be
heard on any complaint, motion, or other

49. See, e.g., Boudakian v. Boudakian, 240 N.Y. L.J. 123 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 2,
2008) (finding the defendant did not have expectation of privacy in e-mail
account accessible through family computer).
50. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50076 (S.D. Ohio July 21, 2006).
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pleading seeking issuance of such an order.51
In granting relief, the judge made an important
observation about the nature of privacy in electronically
communicated media:
While the Court is prepared to reconsider its
views upon the presentation of further evidence
on these points, it is not persuaded—as an initial
matter—that an individual surrenders his
reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal
e-mails once he allows those e-mails (or
electronic copies thereof) to be stored on a
subscriber account maintained on the server of a
commercial ISP. As such, the Court finds that
Warshak has shown a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits of his Fourth Amendment
claim.52
However, on appeal, the Sixth Circuit did not believe that
the constitutionality of the SCA‟s delayed notification
provision53 and the question of whether e-mail passing through
the hands of third party hosts engendered a reasonable
expectation of privacy were ripe for resolution and vacated the
injunction:

51. Id. at *33.
52. Id. at *19 (footnotes omitted).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006) (“A governmental entity may require the
disclosure by a provider of electronic communication service of the contents of
a wire or electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in an
electronic communications system for one hundred and eighty days or less,
only pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, issued
using State warrant procedures) by a court of competent jurisdiction. A
governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of electronic
communications services of the contents of a wire or electronic
communication that has been in electronic storage in an electronic
communications system for more than one hundred and eighty days by the
means available under subsection (b) of this section.”).
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Our reluctance to hypothesize how the
government might conduct a conjectural search
of Warshak‟s e-mails, then resolve the
constitutionality of that search as well as any
others the government might conduct under the
statute, is reinforced by another reality: The
Stored Communications Act has been in
existence since 1986 and to our knowledge has
not been the subject of any successful Fourth
Amendment challenges, in any context, whether
to § 2703(d) or to any other provision. If it “is
often true” that reviewing “legislation in advance
of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a
concrete case involves too remote and abstract an
inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial
function,” the same is assuredly true when we
have no precedent to guide us. Discretion,
indeed, is the better part of valor.54
While e-mail is akin to a phone call or private
correspondence, social networking has an entirely different set
of rules. Privacy in social media seems to be a fluctuating
concept depending on the circumstances.55 The presence of that
information on a third-party site, a form of personal cloud
computing,56 is an important factor. Social media is different

54. Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 531 (6th Cir. 2008)
(internal citations omitted).
55. See, e.g., Yath v. Fairview Clinics, N. P., 767 N.W.2d 34, 44-45
(Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (“The MySpace.com webpage that triggers Yath‟s claim
[invasion of privacy--publication of private facts] was such a site. Access to it
was not protected, as some web pages are, by a password or some other
restrictive safeguard. It was a window that Yath‟s enemies propped open for
at least 24 hours allowing any internet-connected voyeur access to private
details of her life. The claim therefore survives the „publicity‟ challenge.”
However, “[b]ecause Yath failed to produce any evidence on an essential
element of her claim—specifically, that any of the defendants surviving on
appeal were involved in creating or sustaining the disparaging MySpace.com
webpage—her invasion-of-privacy claim fails.”).
56. See Shane Schick, Head in the Clouds? Welcome to the Future, GLOBE
&
MAIL
(Toronto),
May
29,
2007,
available
at
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/blogs /article799712.ece (“Cloud computing

19

2011] ETHICAL & CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARIES

247

from traditional mail, electronic mail, telephone calls, and
telefacsimiles. Those familiar forms of communication transit
through third party sites that incidentally and temporarily
store information, contrasted with social networking services
that are designed to store information as if they were a
personal computer. Furthermore, social media is distinct from
other mediums of communication because of its unique
information sharing capabilities and the risks of unrestrained
republication of personal data. In answering the questions of
whether something offsite was realistically meant to be private,
the terms of service, user expectations, webware, and current
practices must all be examined.
There appears to be conflict in the approaches to social
media privacy. People want to be popular and connected, while
at the same time reserve their right to selectively fence off
their activities.57 In other words, they want to have their cake

is essentially a large-scale distributed computing system that taps into the
vast resources of the Internet. Individual PCs access the „cloud‟ of data rather
than their own data centre and rent products or services such as extra
storage space or applications from companies like Amazon.com or Google.”).
57. See James Grimmelmann, Privacy as Product Safety, 19 WIDENER
L.J. 793, 800 (2010) (“The point is not that these „Digital Natives‟ prize
privacy above all else or that they experience privacy in the same way
previous generations did or that the social content of privacy is stable. The
privacy they care about is social and relational, perhaps less concerned with
databases and governmental surveillance than their parents‟ and
grandparents‟ privacy. They are constantly trading their privacy off against
other social opportunities and making pragmatic judgment calls about what
to reveal and what to keep hidden. However, they do care about privacy, and
they act accordingly.”) (footnotes omitted). See generally MARY MADDEN &
AARON SMITH, REPUTATION MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL MEDIA 2-3 (2010),
available
at
http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2010/PIP_Reputation_Manage
ment_with_topline.pdf (“The increased prevalence of self-monitoring and
observation of others creates a dynamic environment where people promote
themselves or shroud themselves depending on their intended audience and
circumstances. There are good reasons to be more vigilant. Online reputation
matters; 44% of online adults have searched for information about someone
whose services or advice they seek in a professional capacity. People are now
more likely to work for an employer that has policies about how they present
themselves online, and co-workers and business competitors now keep closer
tabs on one another. Those who are dating are more likely to research their
potential mates online. And even neighbors have become more curious about
finding information about one another online. Yet, even those who are careful
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and eat it too. Without specific remedies, they are left to
regulate themselves, which can lead to posting false
information online, a behavior that ethics committees,
prosecutors, and service providers try to prohibit. However,
this identity masking is sometimes the result of people trying
to protect their reputations.
Compromising photos, ill-considered rants, or “what was I
thinking moments” recorded and posted impulsively might end
up in a human resources file58 or before a university
admissions committee. College-bound students have begun
creating profiles with aliases to avoid being linked to a youthful
indiscretion that they would not want a college recruiter to
see.59 And one scholar has pointed out how much further the
masking goes:
[A]s soon as you scratch beneath the surface of
Facebook social practices, carefully modulated
about their own disclosures have to stay on top of the identifying material
that others may have posted about them on social networking profiles, photoand video-sharing sites, Twitter and blogs.”).
58. See, e.g., Emma Barnett, Facebook Users Concerned About Privacy,
Says
Survey,
TELEGRAPH,
April
26,
2010,
available
at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/facebook/7635125/Facebook-usersconcerned-about-privacy-says-survey.html (“F-Secure, an internet security
firm which polled 450 Facebook users, found that 73 per cent were not
„friends‟ with their boss on the site. The survey also found that 77 per cent
said that they use the site‟s privacy tools to safeguard their private
information. The poll discovered that Facebook users have become
increasingly aware of the need to ensure their personal information and
status updates remain private with 35 per cent of pollsters admitting posting
something on the site they later regretted.”).
59. See, e.g., Sarah Maslin Nir, An Online Alias Keeps Colleges Off Their
Trail,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Apr.
25,
2010,
at
ST8,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/25/
fashion/25Noticed.html
(“Michael
Goldman, who graduated last year from the Frisch School in Paramus, N.J.,
estimated that nearly half his friends changed their Facebook names in the
last two years of high school. „At this point it‟s not done as much for the sake
for being functional,‟ Mr. Goldman said. „Now it‟s gotten just more to be
trendy.‟ Once they are accepted, most revert to their actual names. Kwame
Kruw Ocran, a senior at Brooklyn Technical High School, thinks hiding
behind a pseudonym isn‟t safe enough. He held a cleanse week last summer,
where via Facebook he encouraged more than 1,000 of his fellow students to
remove anything incriminating from their online profiles before applying to
colleges.”).
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privacy management is everywhere, Danah Boyd
has documented how teens on Facebook,
MySpace, and other social media use fake
profiles, fake names, fake ages, and a cloud of
other minor lies to keep their profiles safe from
prying (usually parental) eyes while also
connecting with their peers. Meanwhile, college
students coming back from a night of partying
have learned that the first thing they need to do
is check Facebook and untag their names from
any photos of them doing keg stands, lest their
athletic coaches or campus police catch them
drinking.60
In addition, false profiling or concealment can complicate
the prosecution and adjudication of criminal cases. For
example, threatening, harassing, and fake messages or
contacts can be conducted through a phony profile. And this
creates a serious concern in domestic violence cases, where the
free range of Facebook and MySpace can allow any
unauthenticated person to pose as anyone and make contact
with a victim.61

60. Grimmelmann, supra note 57, at 799-800 (footnotes omitted).
61. See Laurie L. Baughman, Friend Request or Foe? Confirming the
Misuse of Internet and Social Networking Sites by Domestic Violence
Perpetrators, 19 WIDENER L.J. 933, 944 (2010) (“Because social networking
sites allow individuals to freely post photos, comments, and other personal
information, a new wealth of information is placed at the fingertips of
abusers. Even if the victim does not post personal content on the Internet and
does not have a page of his or her own, an abuser may be able to track down
the previously unknown location of a victim if a family member, child, or
friend posts a picture or other personal information about the victim and/or
the victim's children online. Privacy settings allow users to limit the
availability of their information to certain friends or family members, rather
than the general public. However, a simple search of a social networking site
allows an abuser to access information about a victim without approved
access to the victim's profile or page. Additionally, social networking sites run
on the honor system. The sites do not check into whether a user who creates a
profile is in fact a real person, so the creation of a fake profile is as easy as
the creation of a real profile. A fake profile may allow an abuser to access the
site of a victim or victim's family member, when an authentic profile would
act as a red flag.”) (footnotes omitted).
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These behaviors illustrate that social media participants
have a different impression of privacy than they would expect
in a sealed envelope, a phone call, or the contents of their own
hard drive. They want privacy but on their own terms.62 Social
and private are usually antithetical ideas, particularly online.
And if the membership of a social media service treats identity
deception as an accepted and necessary practice, or as
ungovernable, then pretexting by lawyers63 and investigators
might fall within the mores of that online society.
III. Discovery
The propriety of entering the fenced off portions of
cyberspace in pursuit of litigation ends has kicked up a storm
of reactions. Federal and state legislatures are scrambling to
enact or amend laws to adjust to this new media, filling gaps in
criminal behavior, e.g., cyberbullying,64 and addressing the

62. Grimmelmann, supra note 57, at 800 (“The point is not that these
„Digital Natives‟ prize privacy above all else or that they experience privacy
in the same way previous generations did or that the social content of privacy
is stable. The privacy they care about is social and relational, perhaps less
concerned with databases and governmental surveillance than their parents‟
and grandparents‟ privacy. They are constantly trading their privacy off
against other social opportunities and making pragmatic judgment calls
about what to reveal and what to keep hidden. However, they do care about
privacy, and they act accordingly.”).
63. Considering the unknown degree of deception, puffing, and
exaggeration that users engage in, information quality also becomes an
important, separate issue. But the first step is gaining access to the witness,
whose evidence can be evaluated later in the crucible of the courtroom. See
Seth P. Berman et al., Web 2.0: What‟s Evidence Between „Friends‟?, BOSTON
B.J., Jan/Feb 2009, at 5, available at http://www.strozfriedberg.com/
files/Publication/dc2b8838-3e1c-43c8871d03875d982c2e/Presentation/PublicationAtta chment/0165df77-27cf-4d928438-15a274986a9c/bbj_janfeb_09%20First%20Principles .pdf.
64. See Kristopher Accardi, Is Violating an Internet Service Provider‟s
Terms of Service an Example of Computer Fraud and Abuse?: An Analytical
Look at the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Lori Drew‟s Conviction and
Cyberbullying, 37 W. ST. U. L. REV. 67, 68-70 (2009) (describes the
distinctions among the new types of offenses aimed at abusive behavior
conducted through electronic media, i.e., cyberbullying, cyberstalking, and
cyberharassment).
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basics of procedure, e.g., service of process.65 The equation of
social networking sites with recognized forms of
communication has opened the door to legal process and might
support the legitimacy of other actions, such as pretrial
discovery by private parties.
Facebook and MySpace have become social replay for
hundreds of millions of people, where the data of their lives can
be viewed and reviewed at will. And one of the core features of
these sites is communication. The legal system places a
premium on modes of communication, which opens up a host of
applications in criminal and civil practice, from search
warrants to starting a civil action. For instance, service of
process, the act of providing an opposing party with notice of an
action, has evolved constitutionally with technology changes.
At the heart of effective service are methods “reasonably
calculated” to reach the parties in interest.66 From manually
handing a notice and complaint to a person in the forum state
to nail, mail, and file to telex, fax, text messaging, e-mail, and
even television,67 courts have recognized these modes as
acceptable under due process and statutory standards—neither
of which ever contemplated electronic service of process.68 The
underlying rationale behind the due process evolution of forms
of service has been the unavailability of traditional formats,
and widespread use and acceptance of new communication
65. See generally Andriana L. Shultz, Superpoked and Served: Service of
Process Via Social Networking Sites, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1497 (2009)
(discusses the evolution of service of process founded on due process and
statutory procedures and leading to the recognition of Facebook and other
media as court approved methods).
66. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950) (“An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”).
67. See, e.g., Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afg., Nos. 01 CIV 10132(HB),
01 CIV 10144(HB), 2001 WL 1658211, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2001)
(“Service by Smith and Doe on Bin Laden will be by publication for six (6)
weeks in all of the following media outlets: (1) Afghani newspapers Hewad,
Anis, Kabul News, and the Kabul Times; (2) Pakistani newspaper Wahat, the
paper in which Bin Laden has published his Fatwahs; and (3) broadcasters Al
Jazeera, Turkish CNN, BBC World, ARN, and ADF.”) (emphasis added).
68. Shultz, supra note 65, at 1503-07.
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technologies. In the right cases, unprecedented applications of
new media might be sanctioned as a new approach “reasonably
calculated” to serve process, and opens the door to applying
them in other legal procedures.69
The most prominent example of social networking as
communication conduit is the newly recognized use of Facebook
for service of process. At the forefront, Australia‟s courts have
approved contact through a person‟s profile as sufficient to
satisfy the standards for serving notice, complaints and orders.
In each case, social networking was the only, and as it turned
out best, option available.
In the first reported case of its kind, an Australian court
endorsed Facebook communication as a means of satisfying the
notice requirements for a default judgment.70 A master of the
Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory reached
beyond the furthest ends of civil procedure to recognize this
new form of substituted service. “Master Harper ordered that
the defendants in the case could be validly served by the
plaintiff sending a message by computer to the Facebook pages
of both defendants informing them of the entry of and the
terms of the judgment.”71
Two years later, another Australian litigant was granted
relief through Facebook. A Sydney woman tried to obtain a
paternity test from an elusive man, called Mr. Howard, whom

69. Id. at 1523 (“Courts that have upheld as constitutional service of
process through new communication technologies generally have begun by
noting the widespread societal embrace of the technology in other facets of
life. In theory, this should have virtually no bearing on whether service is
upheld in a given case because due process analyses in this context are, by
nature, fact specific. In other words, the fact that the technology is widely
employed in the community at large does not entail that it is reasonably
calculated to provide the particular defendant notice. What is good for the
goose is not always good for the gander. Nonetheless, even assuming that
widespread use plays a role in the court's decision, Facebook could reasonably
be taken as widespread enough to gain approval.”) (Footnotes omitted).
70. Nick Abrahams, Australian Court Serves Documents via Facebook,
SYDNEY
MORNING
HERALD,
Dec.
12,
2008,
available
at
http://www.smh.com.au/news/technology/web/court-serves-documents-viafacebook/2008/12/12/1228585107578.html.
71. Id.
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she claimed was the father.72 Her letters went unanswered,
efforts to contact him through his parents and girlfriend failed,
and the process server was unsuccessful. Although his physical
address was in flux, his Facebook profile was stable and
routinely used. The woman‟s solicitor informed Federal
Magistrate Brown that a “private message” could be sent to the
man‟s online account. Satisfied with the efficacy of this form of
service, the court granted an order to serve the documents via
Facebook.73
After receiving the documents, Mr. Howard promptly
closed his Facebook and MySpace profiles. Nonetheless, the
court imposed an order of paternity and child support on Mr.
Howard, since he had been properly served. In the light of this
second decision affirming legal process through social
networking, Dr. Tim Butcher, a senior lecturer at the Royal
Melbourne Institute of Technology, observed: “People are
finding new ways to use social media every day,” he said. “It‟s
only natural that courts, businesses, government agencies will
use these tools to track us down. You have the world at your
fingertips—but the flip side is that people can find us as
well.”74
The e-service precedent begins to marshal support for
other direct legal applications of Facebook, MySpace, and
Twitter on the same grounds as other communication media. In
these cases, the courts have approved private litigants
accessing an opposing party‟s social networking profile to
ascertain identity and the stability of the site for accepting
communications. And it makes sense that a network like
Facebook, with 500 million profiles, is viewed as a reliable
channel for communication; indeed it is the reason the

72. Kim Arlington, Court Uses Facebook to Serve Paternity Test Order,
SYDNEY
MORNING
HERALD,
June
4,
2010,
available
at
http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/court-uses-facebook-toserve-paternity-test-order-20100603-x7dc.html.
73. Id. (“In a recently published judgment, delivered in Adelaide, Mr.
Brown said he was satisfied Mr. Howard had been properly served with the
documents and inferred Mr. Howard wanted no involvement as „the
parentage test can have only one outcome because he is [the child‟s] father.‟”).
74. Id.
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company is in business.75
However, there has been no mention of the mechanism by
which this information had been obtained. Did the plaintiffs
already have accounts and use their privileges as members to
unearth the data or did they do it surreptitiously, using a fake
profile or a legitimate one that masked their purpose? Mr.
Howard did not hesitate to take down his profiles after being
served, indicating that he would not have willingly accepted a
“Friend” request from a woman or her representative seeking a
paternity test. So it is unclear what actions the lawyers,
investigators, or plaintiffs undertook to complete service.
It is significant that the parties being reached could not be
contacted through traditional means. Social media became the
sole and best choice in these circumstances. Similarly,
information impeaching a witness or providing leads to
exculpatory evidence might only be found in unique places like
Facebook or MySpace. Someone‟s online profile might be the
only place that an inconsistent statement or contradictory
version of testimony can be found, or even a confession pointing
to someone else‟s guilt. For this reason alone, the “uniqueness”
of the evidence source, social media investigation warrants
legal and ethical sanction.76
Confirming the identification of the profile‟s owner,
confronting privacy limitations and terms of service
restrictions, and analyzing ethical rules about using deception
or providing false statements are all issues to be considered in
75. “Facebook‟s mission is to give people the power to share and make
the
world
more
open
and
connected.”
FACEBOOK.COM,
http://www.facebook.com/facebook?ref=pf/r.php?locale=en_US#!/facebook?v=i
nfo&ref=pf%2Fr.php%3Flocale%3Den_US (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).
76. Schultz, supra note 65, at 1528 (“The Australian case permitting
service of a default judgment via Facebook foreshadows future attempts to
employ social networking sites to effectuate legal ends. As this comment
illustrates, attempted service of process through Facebook may very well be
permissible under Rule 4(f)(3) for serving foreign defendants, and such
service does not appear to constitute a per se due process violation, no matter
how narrow the circumstances permitting such service might be. Necessity,
the mother of invention, has frequently been the catalyst for adapting the law
to implement new technologies, and if a situation arises in which a message
sent via Facebook is the only available means to serve an elusive defendant
abroad, the law might, in due time, adapt accordingly.”) (footnote omitted).
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online investigations. At the same time, courts and legislators
ought to recognize the unqualified necessity of using social
media as a foundation for discovery and case preparation. The
principal concern in most cases is the destruction of ephemeral
evidence.
IV. Spoliation: Preservation of Evidence
To address spoliation, one approach would be to seek an ex
parte discovery order from the trial court, like a protective
order, requiring that the party‟s or witness‟ profile be frozen
and downloaded.77 The order might be addressed to either the
person who posted the profile or the network provider that
hosts it. The profile‟s contents should be reviewed in camera to
confirm identifying information, a preliminary issue linking
the profile to the actual person, and then examined for content,
e.g., exculpatory evidence, impeachment, or other relevant
information.78 This preservation step will be crucial to
safeguarding important and unique evidence.
In People v. Hardaway,79 a Michigan defendant appealed
his conviction for third-degree criminal sexual conduct claiming
ineffectiveness of counsel, among other issues. The crux of the
appeal was his attorney‟s failure to preserve the contents of the
victim‟s social networking profile and use it for impeachment at

77. See Lloyd S. van Oosternrijk, Comment, Paper or Plastic?: Electronic
Discovery and Spoliation in the Digital Age, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1163, 1183
(2005) (“Only a few state courts have addressed the unique role of electronic
discovery in today‟s trials, but cost-shifting in electronic discovery cases has
come into vogue in the federal arena. Generally speaking, the current Rule
26(c) allows a responding party to seek a protective order shifting the cost of
discovery when the cost would create an undue burden.”) (footnotes omitted).
78. See, e.g., Leanne Italie, Divorce Lawyers: Facebook Tops in Online
Evidence, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July 2, 2010, available at
http://www.mercurynews.com /business/ci_15429107 (“Oversharing on social
networks has led to an overabundance of evidence in divorce cases. The
American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers says 81 percent of its members
have used or faced evidence plucked from Facebook, MySpace, Twitter and
other social networking sites, including YouTube and LinkedIn, over the past
five years.”).
79. No. 284980, 2009 Mich. App. LEXIS 1912, at *1 (Ct. App. Sept. 17,
2009).
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the bench trial:
According to defendant, the web page would have
established that the victim had a “pattern of
lying” because the victim, on her MySpace page,
claimed that she was 18 years old and married.
Defendant also argues that counsel was
ineffective for failing to inquire into the
disappearance of the victim‟s MySpace page.
Defendant claims that had counsel done so,
counsel “may have been able” to establish a
Brady violation.80
By the trial date, the victim‟s online profile had
disappeared, like Mr. Howard‟s. Nonetheless, the evidence
came in through another route, and defendant‟s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim was denied.81 Still, the question
remains: what are an attorney‟s obligations under the
Constitution and the Rules of Professional Conduct in this
situation?
If the privacy issue and terms of service hurdles were
removed, then the duties of counsel and the court might be
made clear. In Torres v. Lexington Insurance Co.,82 plaintiff
claimed that she had been sexually assaulted during a massage
she received at one of the defendants‟ hotel. Her complaint
stated that “she suffered and continues to suffer intense mental
anguish, feelings of shame, humiliation, depression,
unworthiness, weeping and has been forced to undergo
psychological treatment and therapy.”83 Attorneys for the
80. Id. at *2-3 (footnote omitted).
81. Id. at *2-3 (“However, the trier of fact knew what defendant argues
the victim‟s MySpace page would have established—that the victim lied
about her age and marital status. On cross-examination, the victim admitted
that she lied on her MySpace page about her age and marital status.
Accordingly, there is no reasonable probability that if counsel had
investigated the disappearance of the victim‟s MySpace page or presented the
web page as evidence at trial, the result of defendant‟s trial would have been
different.”).
82. 237 F.R.D. 533 (P.R. 2006).
83. Id. at 534.
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defendants had learned independently, not through procedural
discovery channels, that the plaintiff had several web pages
“depicting an active social life, and an aspiring singing and
modeling career.”84 Plaintiff and her counsel were unaware
that these pages had been uncovered by the other side. The
defendants downloaded and printed out most of their contents,
and then notified plaintiff‟s counsel that “eliminating or
altering the websites could be considered spoliation or evidence
tampering.”85 Two days later, the web pages were gone without
explanation. Defense counsel moved to dismiss the lawsuit or
eliminate or reduce the damages. In response, the court
ordered sanctions:
In this case, Mrs. Torres did not make it known
to defendants that she had an aspiring modeling
or singing career. In fact, she attempted to depict
the life of a recluse with no or little social
interaction. Instead, Mrs. Torres led an active
social life and announced this information to the
world by posting it on very public internet sites.
Then, immediately upon defendants‟ discovery of
evidence, which could be used to contradict or
impeach her allegations, Mrs. Torres removed
the information from the internet. This is the
type of unconscionable scheme the court seeks to
deter.86
To remedy the spoliation problem the judge made several
decisions. He declined to dismiss the complaint or limit a
finding on damages, but precluded plaintiff from introducing
any evidence of mental anguish. Furthermore, he concluded
that the defendants‟ actions in preserving the pages‟ contents
by downloading and printing them out did not factor into the

84. Id. at 533-34. See generally Oregon State Bar Legal Ethics Comm.,
Formal Op. 2005-164 (2005).
85. Id. at 534.
86. Id.
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analysis.87 The court separated the action of evidence spoliation
from the mechanics of investigating and uncovering the web
content. This lends support to the idea that a court would be
empowered to issue a sanctionable preservation order. In
addition, it leaves for separate consideration the means for
opposing counsel to discover the existence of an online profile.
The public or private nature of the site would be the only fly in
the ointment.
The defense might make additional applications based on a
due process right to present a defense88 to seek any data that
might lead to additional evidence,89 such as a Friends list or
references to Brady or Jencks90 material. While no published
decision has yet concluded that a social networking profile
contained Brady or Jencks‟ material or impeaching evidence,
there is anecdotal evidence that it can.
In New York City, a man was arrested for carrying a
loaded weapon.91 The case rested on the credibility of the
arresting officer. His online reputation became a central part of
the defense when evidence from his Facebook page was used
for impeachment. The defendant asserted that he had been
87. Id.
88. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (“The right to offer
the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in
plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the
defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it
may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront
the prosecution‟s witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he
has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is
a fundamental element of due process of law.”).
89. This tocsin about preservation applies with equal force to the client‟s
page. See, e.g., Damiano Beltrami, I‟m Innocent. Just Check My Status on
Facebook, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2009, at A27 (“[Rodney Bradford‟s] defense
lawyer, Robert Reuland, told a Brooklyn assistant district attorney, Lindsay
Gerdes, about the Facebook entry, which was made at the time of the
robbery. The district attorney subpoenaed Facebook to verify that the words
had been typed from a computer at an apartment at 71 West 118th Street in
Manhattan, the home of Mr. Bradford‟s father. When that was confirmed, the
charges were dropped.”).
90. See generally John T. Bandler, The New York Rosario Rule Applied
to Computerized Documents: The Rigid and Impractical Duplicative
Equivalent Doctrine Requires Modification, 22 PACE L. REV. 407 (2002).
91. See, e.g., Jim Dwier, The Officer Who Posted Too Much on MySpace,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2009, at A24.
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stopped and assaulted by the officer and his partner (leaving
him with three broken ribs); the officers then planted the gun
to cover up their conduct. However, the jurors learned that the
officer had set his Facebook page to “devious mood,” and that
he had listed his status as watching the movie Training Day to
“brush up on proper police procedure.” Ultimately, the
defendant was acquitted of the gun charge, but convicted for
resisting arrest.
Defense counsel were led to the officer‟s profile from an
Internet search92 that revealed statements he had made about
video clips showing suspects being arrested, and in which he
talked about “tuning up arrestees” before putting on the cuffs.93
The online statements supported the defense‟s theory that the
officer intended to cover-up his use of excessive force. However,
there is no way to know exactly how the jurors processed this
information because they acquitted on the principal felony
charge but still convicted on resisting arrest.
Nonetheless, any impeachment evidence has the potential
of raising reasonable doubt. The question for the defense is how
to find it and for the jury how to weigh it. Social media as
evidence is inextricably tied to its discoverability, and will
bring up questions of authenticity, weight, and credibility.94

92. See generally CAROLE LEVITT & MARK ROSCH, FIND INFO LIKE A PRO,
VOLUME 1: MINING THE INTERNET‟S PUBLICLY AVAILABLE RESOURCES FOR
INVESTIGATIVE RESEARCH (2010); Tamara Thompson, Due Diligence with
Social Networks: Benefits of This New Information Arena, 195 N.J. L.J. 302,
Feb. 2, 2009.
93. Injudicious statements and misuse of social media has sounded a
warning bell in the law enforcement community, prompting a call for
workplace standards. See Terrence P. Dwyer, Pitfalls for Police Officers on
Facebook, POLICEONE.COM (Aug. 11, 2010), http://www.policeone.com/offduty/articles/2304799-Pitfalls-for-police-officers-on-social-networking-sites/
(“Police administrators are well advised to adopt a social networking policy if
they have not already started to do so. Police officers are advised to keep
content unobjectionable at the least, but would be better off staying clear of
online postings and video rants. The democratization of media use has
created a „big brother‟ of monstrous proportions and can quickly become a
trap for the careless officer.”).
94. See generally Kamika Dunlap, Facebook Alibi: Social Media as
Defense Evidence, FINDLAW BLOTTER (Nov. 12, 2009, 2:00 PM),
http://blogs.findlaw.com/blotter/2009/11/facebook-alibi-social-media-asdefense-eviden ce.html (“Authenticating your Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, or
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The prosecutor in the New York City case argued that the
Training Day comments were protected speech, criticism of a
movie, and irrelevant to the circumstances of the arrest. Still,
the judge allowed the evidence in. Privacy, freedom of
expression, and weight of the evidence are all factors that must
be addressed in every instance where this type of self-published
evidence will be used. Context is as important as content in the
world of social media evidence.
V. Spoliation: Preserving Defense Evidence
Before counsel has had an opportunity to review a client‟s
social media profile, the government might already be aware of
it and reveal its intent to use the contents through the normal
course of discovery.95 In other words, law enforcement or the
prosecution may have built their indictment on the material
found on MySpace or Facebook during an investigation or
before bringing formal charges.96
In a computer-based crime, such as illicit pornography, a
defendant‟s computer would be seized.97 It might also happen
whatever social networking account you have will be key.”).
95. United States v. Drummond, No. 1:09-cr-00159, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 29981 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2010) (pictures from defendant‟s MySpace
page, where he had large amounts of cash and held a gun, were made known
through the regular channels of discovery).
96. See Randy L. Dryer, Advising Your Clients (and You!) in the New
World of Social Media: What Every Lawyer Should Know About Twitter,
Facebook, YouTube, & Wikis, 23 UTAH B.J. 16, 19 (2010), available at
http://www.utahbar.org/barjournal /pdf/May_June_2010.pdf (“Social media
clearly expands the universe of potentially discoverable materials and
impacts data retention/destruction policies. Just as requests for e-mails were
the discovery rage of the last decade, requests for information on social media
platforms will soon become standard. Unlike the early internet days where
digital information was primarily e-mails, information now posted on social
media sites includes audio, photographs, and video. Virtually everyone has a
cell phone, and virtually every cell phone has both still photograph and video
capabilities. And in 2010 we are seeing more and more ways for people to
access their social media sites (and upload content) through their mobile
phones. These new technologies are dramatically changing the discovery
landscape.”).
97. See generally Electronic Evidence and Search & Seizure Legal
Resources, COMPUTER CRIME & INTELL. PROP. SEC., U.S. DEP‟T OF JUST.
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/searching.html (last visited Oct.
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in prosecutions involving social media. However, what should
be done with the material on the third party provider‟s site?
Can defense counsel advise his client to take down the
incriminating photographs? Can the prosecutor prevent it? And
can the court intervene?
Several recent cases seem to cast doubt on the wisdom of
advising a client about the disposition of online profiles or
other social media. There are risks that such advice might
constitute evidence tampering or obstructing governmental
administration, which could lead to criminal conviction and
disbarment. In Matter of Coren,98 a New York attorney pleaded
guilty to federal felonies that included “mail fraud, wire fraud,
money laundering, conspiracy to commit money laundering and
obstruction of justice (tampering with physical evidence).”99 He
had allegedly participated in a conspiracy with a client to
defraud the federal government regarding the administration
of funds for wage contracts.100 The Disciplinary Committee for
the New York First Judicial Department sought an order for
disbarment based on the federal felony conviction. Ultimately,
the attorney lost his legal challenge to downgrade the
proceeding from automatic disbarment to a serious crime
matter. The issue hinged on the similarity between New York
and federal laws on tampering and obstruction of justice. The
Appellate Division concluded that there was an “essential
similarity” between the two and upheld the disbarment.101
Noteworthy was the plea allocution:
[R]egarding the count in the indictment charging
obstruction of justice, I admit that on February 3,
2006, I advised Nomi Beig [his client] in response
to a question he posed to me that he should

1, 2010).
98. 76 A.D.3d 285, 285 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 2010).
99. Id. at 286.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 287 (“Respondent‟s conviction for obstruction of justice in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) is a proper predicate for disbarment because
there is „essential similarity‟ between that federal statute and the New York
felony of tampering with physical evidence (Penal Law § 215.40[2]).”).
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destroy a computer flash drive containing
documents that I advised him to remove from his
office when I heard that his company was under
investigation. I knew that by doing so Nomi
would be destroying documents that could have
been used in a Government investigation.102
Although he did not erase the computer records himself,
the attorney was charged with actual tampering, as opposed to
attempted tampering that would have reduced the charge to a
misdemeanor under New York law. His plea to this count of the
federal indictment was sufficient to support automatic
disbarment.
In another obstruction case, a Connecticut attorney, Philip
D. Russell, was indicted for allegedly taking steps to destroy
the contents of his client‟s laptop computer, which contained
evidence of illicit pornography.103 The computer belonged to the
choirmaster of a church, and a fellow employee discovered the
pornographic images while using it for work. A day later,
officials of the church “sealed and wrapped” the laptop,
anticipating its use as evidence.
The choirmaster met with Russell the following day; the
lawyer took possession of the computer and destroyed the hard
drive. Unknown to either of them, an FBI investigation was
already underway against the choirmaster. The Department of
Justice charged the attorney with obstruction of justice and
violation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (anti-shredding
prohibition).104 Russell moved to dismiss the charges both
because the federal investigation was unknown to him at the
time and because the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was not intended to
apply to pornographic contraband. In other words, the
government did not “allege any nexus between his obstructive
conduct and any federal proceeding or investigation that was
102. Id. at 288 (alterations in original); see also United States v. Coren,
No. 07-CR-265 (ENV), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73913, at *27 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.
20, 2009).
103. Evan T. Barr, „Russell‟: Prosecuting Defense Counsel for
Obstruction, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 21, 2007 at 4.
104. United States v. Russell, 639 F. Supp. 2d 226, 230 (D. Conn. 2007).
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reasonably foreseeable to him.”105 The district court judge
denied Russell‟s motion, finding that the “indictment contains
sufficient factual particularity showing a relationship in time,
causation, and logic between Russell‟s destruction of Tate‟s
Computer and a grand jury proceeding or a FBI investigation
to put him on notice of the charges against him.”106 Russell‟s
Sarbanes interpretation was also rejected.107 Ultimately, he
was sentenced to six-months of home confinement, a
substantial fine and community service.108
These two cases highlight the risks of counseling or aiding
a client in the destruction or removal of computer-based
evidence. On the flip side, what if the prosecutor advises the
complainant, law enforcement, experts, or a fact witness to
purge their multimedia online profiles, forestalling defense
investigators? 109
Another important facet of this problem is when the police
and prosecutors have audited the social media information of
their own witnesses, whether in individual cases or routinely
through department policies.110 In such instances, the contents
of those sites might become Brady or Jencks material, or fall
under the scope of other provisions of the discovery statutes.
Under those circumstances, a court might issue a protective
order preventing its deletion or compelling disclosure.111
105. Id. at 232.
106. Id. at 236.
107. Id. at 237 (“Nothing in the legislative history supports a conclusion
that the drafters intended to narrowly circumscribe its application to the
destruction of business records and documents.”).
108. See John Christoffersen, Lawyer Who Destroyed Evidence in Porn
Case Spared Prison Time, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 18, 2007, available at
http://www.law.com /jsp/article.jsp?id=1197980085647.
109. See generally Gregory G. Sarno, Interference by Prosecution with
Defense Counsel‟s Pretrial Interrogation of Witnesses, 90 A.L.R.3d 1231
(1979).
110. See, e.g., Rocco Parascandola & Laura Rivera, NYPD Rookies
Warned About MySpace, Facebook Pages, NEWSDAY, May 6, 2008.
111. See, e.g., Dryer, supra note 96, at 19 (“Posts on social media are
within the scope of „electronically stored information‟ as that term is used in
Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Litigation hold letters likely
trigger an obligation to preserve such posts if they are reasonably related to
the litigation. This means that just like companies had to revise their
document retention and destruction policies and their internal protocols for
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Other pitfalls include the risks of independent research or
communication online by judges, jurors, or other parties and
witnesses in a case, which might taint or prompt the deletion of
such evidence.112 A social media snapshot of the state‟s
witnesses might be required to protect the defendant‟s
constitutional and statutory discovery rights at a time when
guidance on obtaining that information independently is
unclear.
VI. Undercover Investigation (Pretexting)
The key to understanding how a lawyer should operate in
the social networking context is the recognition that new
approaches are necessary. All the rules that the legal
profession relies on to instruct lawyer behavior were forged
before the emergence of twenty-first century technology. The
rule book for this young century has not been written yet, but
the foundations are there. The application of those principles is
informed by post-Internet thinking and current online
realities.113
Failure to adequately investigate a crime or witnesses,
whether in the real or virtual worlds, can violate the right to
counsel and due process.114 Surreptitious online investigation
handling litigation hold requests when e-mail became a pervasive way of
communicating, so too will these policies require updating to address the
nuances of social media.”).
112. See generally Pitfalls, supra note 13, at 5 (discusses ethical
problems that can occur when judges and lawyers contact each other through
social networking, and the dangers of independent factual investigations
through the same method).
113. See generally ABA, Agenda for Ethics 20/20 Project Examines
Impact of Technology, Disappearing Borders, 25 LAW. MAN. PROF. CONDUCT
694 (2009), http://www.abanet.org/ethics2020/impact.pdf (Social networking
is among the issues to be addressed by the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20
during its three year tenure).
114. See, e.g., Thomas v. Kuhlman, 255 F. Supp. 2d 99, 107 (E.D.N.Y.
2003) (“Counsel „has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.‟”).
Where the nature of the crime scene is material to the defense, counsel may
be deemed ineffective for having failed to investigate it properly. See, e.g.,
Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 680-81 (7th Cir. 1995) (ineffective
assistance in part for failure to investigate crime scene where doing so would
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in some cases might be the best or only method for uncovering
crucial information, which might otherwise be deleted or
compromised. The lawyer who fails to pursue it might risk
accusations of malpractice and ineffectiveness of counsel. It is a
difficult needle to thread.
With the rapid pace of technological development, lawyers
have had to confront unprecedented issues on how to conduct
discovery, litigation, and professional relations in the face of
metadata, data mining,115 and now social networking. This
adds a new wrinkle to the initial client intake. Besides asking
for contact information and employment history, an attorney
may be obligated to inquire into a client‟s online presence.
Whether the lawyer should do it independently without the
client‟s knowledge raises ethical issues. Of course, asking the
client directly begs the question of what to do with the answer.
Accessing Facebook or MySpace is not the same as a
Google search about a client that would only bring up data
available to anyone. The former sites have public and private
areas. A visitor can search the public segment without
constraint, but to go further and see a client‟s profile,
membership (registration and agreement to terms of service) is
required. Without a client‟s consent, the lawyer may be
overstepping the network‟s terms of service and pushing the
limits of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Mechanically, a
visit to an online profile might only involve observation and
recording.116 On the other hand, Friending is a form of contact.
have revealed evidence that, “given the layout of the home and the relatively
crowded conditions, the alleged assault could not have taken place as
claimed.”); People v. Donovan, 184 A.D.2d 654, 655 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)
(ineffective assistance where counsel failed “to dispatch an investigator to the
scene [of defendant's arrest] . . . until after the trial had commenced,” leaving
him “unprepared to effectively argue [the issue] before the court”).
115. See, e.g., Armen Keteyian, Digital Photocopiers Loaded with
Secrets,
CBSNEWS.COM
(Apr.
15,
2010),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/04/19/eveningnews/main6412439.shtml
?tag=mncol;lst;1 (hard drives of common office equipment, often discarded,
may contain valuable data). See generally Andrew M. Perlman, Legal Ethics
of Metadata Mining, 43 AKRON L. REV. 785 (2010).
116. But see, e.g., Ethics Comm. of the Colo. Bar Ass‟n, Formal Op. 60
(1982),
http://www.cobar.org/index.cfm/ID/386/subID/1781/CETH/EthicsOpinion-60:-Duty-with-Respect-to-Client%27s-Incriminating-Physical-
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And in the case of a witness or complainant, the act might
cross the line against communicating with a represented party
or influencing a witness.
The ethical analysis begins with familiar technology, the
telephone. ABA Formal Opinion 337, issued in 1974, declared
“with certain exceptions spelled out in this opinion, no lawyer
should record any conversation whether by tapes or other
electronic device, without the consent or prior knowledge of all
parties to the conversation.”117 The common situations
identified by the Committee included recording conversations
involving clients or witnesses. They relied principally on Canon
9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requiring lawyers
to avoid the appearance of impropriety and DR 1-102(A)(4)
prohibiting “dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation” to
reach that conclusion.118 A law enforcement exception was
acknowledged but not fully explored:
There may be extraordinary circumstances
in which the Attorney General of the United
States or the principal prosecuting attorney of a
state or local government or law enforcement
attorneys or officers acting under the direction of
the Attorney General or such principal
prosecuting attorneys might ethically make and
use secret recordings if acting within strict
statutory
limitations
conforming
to
constitutional requirements. This opinion does
not address such exceptions which would
necessarily require examination on a case by
case basis. It should be stressed, however, that
the mere fact that secret recordation in a
particular instance is not illegal will not
necessarily render the conduct of a public law
Evidence,-07/24/82/ (“When a lawyer observes incriminating evidence as a
result of his representation of the client and does not alter or disturb the
evidence, he must not disclose these observations to authorities.”).
117. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‟l Responsibility, Formal Op. 337
(1974).
118. Id.
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enforcement officer in making such a recording
ethical.119
In 2001, the American Bar Association Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
reexamined its position on the propriety of a lawyer recording a
phone conversation without the other party‟s knowledge and
came to the opposite conclusion from Opinion 337, withdrawing
that precedent.120 The first reason for this change in position
was the issuance of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
The new Rules omitted Canon 9‟s “appearance of impropriety”
admonition, removing a major pillar justifying their earlier
analysis. The fraud and deceit section survived in Model Rule
8.4(c). However, in the intervening quarter century practice
and perspective on this issue had changed:
First, the belief that nonconsensual taping of
conversations is inherently deceitful, embraced
by this Committee in 1974, is not universally
accepted today. The overwhelming majority of
states permit recording by consent of only one
party to the conversation. Surreptitious
recording of conversations is a widespread
practice
by
law
enforcement,
private
investigators and journalists, and the courts
universally accept evidence acquired by such
techniques. Devices for the recording of
telephone conversations on one‟s own phone
readily are available and widely are used. Thus,
even though recording of a conversation without
disclosure may to many people “offend a sense of
honor and fair play,” it is questionable whether
anyone today justifiably relies on an expectation
that a conversation is not being recorded by the
other party, absent a special relationship with or

119. Id.
120. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‟l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-422
(2001).
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conduct by that party inducing a belief that the
conversation will not be recorded.121
Although the Committee did not directly address the
pretexting question,122 it affirmed the “widespread practice” of
surreptitious recording that changed a party‟s or witness‟
expectations. Phone-tapping technology was ubiquitous and
law enforcement and prosecutors as well as private
investigators made use of it. These same factors militate in
favor of accessing a party‟s social media employing common
technology. The difference is in the nature of the
communication, not the recording. Thus far, the ABA opinion
opens the door a crack for contact through the latest
communication/recording medium, social networking.
The second point it made was that the recording involved a
“legitimate and even necessary activity” that would be at risk
from the danger of an attorney tipping her hand too soon. This
concept was born of the numerous exceptions to Opinion 337‟s
proscription found in state bar committee opinions. Of special
note were opinions from Tennessee and Kentucky123 that
recognized the need for “recordings by criminal defense
lawyers, reasoning that the commonly accepted „law
enforcement exception‟ otherwise would give prosecutors an
unfair advantage.”124 It also embraced the constitutional
necessity of leveling the playing field. Some of the other
exceptions they listed are also used as justifications for
pretexting,125 e.g., protecting against witness or client perjury,

121. Id. (footnotes omitted).
122. Id. (“We conclude that the mere act of secretly but lawfully
recording a conversation inherently is not deceitful, and leave for another day
the separate question of when investigative practices involving
misrepresentations of identity and purpose nonetheless may be ethical.”).
123. See Bd. of Prof‟l Responsibility of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn., Formal
Ethics
Op.
86-F-14(a)
(1986),
http://www.tbpr.org/Attorneys/EthicsOpinions/Pdfs/86-F-14%28a%29.pdf; Ky.
Bar
Ass‟n,
Ethics
Op.
KBA
E-279
(1984),
http://www.kybar.org/documents/ethics_opinions/kba_e-279.pdf.
124. Formal Op. 01-422, at 8.
125. See N.Y.C. County Lawyer‟s Ass‟n, Formal Op. 737 (2007),
http://www.nycla.org/siteFiles/Publications/Publications519_0.pdf.
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uncovering
housing
discrimination
and
trademark
infringement, and generally for prosecution and criminal
defense investigations.126
Another important facet of the ABA‟s analysis was the
determination to avoid per se rules and decide each case on its
merits. It did not see the logic in creating a categorical bar
swallowed by exceptions and instead advised interdicting
nonconsensual
recordings
if
accompanied
by
other
misconduct.127
Lastly, the third criticism of Opinion 337, which led to its
reversal, was a change in philosophy. The Mode Code‟s
instruction for attorneys to “avoid even the appearance of
impropriety” had been omitted from the Model Rules. The
rights of third parties were protected under a direct approach
embodied in Rule 4.4(a) “[i]n representing a client, a lawyer
shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other
than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use
methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of
such a person.”128
As applied to nonconsensual phone recordings, Rule 4.4
looked to the purpose behind the action. An intent to
“embarrass” or “burden” a witness, for example, would violate
the Rule. But the Committee did not differentiate taping a
phone conversation from other forms of evidence gathering
since they were not unlawful. The same rationale applied to
situations where the attorney misrepresented that a
conversation was not being recorded. Again, it was not the
acting of recording the phone call that troubled its conscience,
but the accompanying false statement to a third person in
violation of Rule 4.1.129
An attorney or investigator hiding their purpose behind
Friending a witness‟ or a complainant‟s Facebook or MySpace
page might run afoul of this kind of prohibition. Friending in
itself is a lawful, ethical mode of contact. Being secretive about

126.
127.
128.
129.
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Formal Op. 01-422, at 8.
Id.
MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2009).
Formal Op. 01-422, at 5 n.28.
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the purpose or misleading the recipient of the request might
border on a false representation. And it again raises the third
party‟s privacy rights in their profile from surreptitious
solicitations, whether in state law or the terms of service.
The federal and state laws governing Internet conduct are
a patchwork that is continually being tested in the courts. As
Opinion 01-422 pointed out in the case of one-sided phone
recordings, a lawyer must be familiar with the laws of the
jurisdictions involved since Rule 4.4 specifically prohibits
violating the rights of a third party under state law in
conducting discovery or investigation.130 Similarly, an attorney
undertaking discovery through social media must be versed in
the federal and state laws on computer fraud, cyberbullying,
and harassment that might ensnare her. Like telephonic
communication, Internet communication naturally crosses
state boundaries, imposing a burden on the lawyer to know the
rules and laws for the jurisdictions involved—although it
cannot be assumed that such communications are always
interstate.131
The Committee was divided over the advisability of
recording clients without consent and in general considered it
inadvisable. So they recommended advising him or her at the
start that conversations might be recorded. Per force, this
sheds light on the advisability of an attorney viewing a client‟s
MySpace or Facebook page to download or otherwise review its
contents. To do so without the client‟s knowledge or consent,
via pretexting, might violate a lawyer‟s duty of loyalty and risk
damaging the ability to preserve the confidentiality of attorney130. Id. at 6.
131. See United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2007)
(“We recognize in many, if not most, situations the use of the Internet will
involve the movement of communications or materials between states. But
this fact does not suspend the need for evidence of this interstate movement.
The government offered insufficient proof of interstate movement in this
case.”) (footnotes omitted). See generally Colin Fieman, Defending Internet
Pornography Cases by Challenging Interstate Jurisdictional Elements Under
U.S. v. Schaefer, CHAMPION MAG., Jan. 2009, at 32, available at
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/01c1e7698280d20385256d0b00789923/13752
bbd3072166a85257560007eb864?OpenDocument (discussing the importance
of distinguishing intrastate from interstate transmissions of illicit
pornography as an element of the government's case).
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client communications. Moreover, contacting a client through
her online profile or Twitter, etc., whether directly or
undercover, increases the chances of inadvertent disclosure and
destroying privilege. Can a client and attorney communicate by
Friending each other through social media and still expect
their conversations to be privileged?
In an earlier opinion,132 the ABA Standing Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility addressed the sanctity
of e-mail communications, confidentiality, and inadvertent
disclosure. It concluded:
A lawyer may transmit information relating
to the representation of a client by unencrypted
e-mail sent over the Internet without violating
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1998)
because the mode of transmission affords a
reasonable expectation of privacy from a
technological and legal standpoint. The same
privacy accorded U.S. and commercial mail, landline telephonic transmissions, and facsimiles
applies to Internet e-mail. A lawyer should
consult with the client and follow her
instructions, however, as to the mode of
transmitting highly sensitive information
relating to the client‟s representation.133
The Committee‟s reasoning relied heavily on an analysis of
the privacy features of the technology being used. Under Rule
1.6, “(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the
representation of a client unless the client gives informed
consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry
out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by
paragraph (b).”134 And the attorney must take reasonable
measures in selecting a mode of private communication. The

132. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‟l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413
(1999), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/pubs/fo99-413.html.
133. Id.
134. MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009).
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Committee cited the trustworthiness of overland mail, for
example, and the privacy expectations in telephonic
communications. As to other technology, some caution was
indicated, such as facsimile transmission that included a
greater than normal risk of misdirection, interception, or
mishandling. Another area of grave concern was the cell phone.
Cordless and cellular phones broadcasting over public air
waves were susceptible to interception by many commonly
available models of radios and similar devices. And as voice
communication, they were not digitally encoded like e-mail.
The risks of interception and disclosure may
be lessened by the recent introduction of digital
cellular phones, whose transmissions are
considered more difficult to intercept than their
analog counterparts. New communications
technology, however, does not always advance
privacy concerns. The use of airplane telephones,
for example, exposes users to the interception
risks of cellular telephones as well as a
heightened
risk
of
disclosure
due
to
eavesdropping on the airplane itself.135
Finally, they resolved that the safeguards and nature of
Internet-based e-mail provided a reasonable assurance of
privacy.
The fact that ISP administrators or hackers are
capable of intercepting Internet e-mail—albeit
with great difficulty and in violation of federal
law—should not render the expectation of
privacy in this medium any the less reasonable,
just as the risk of illegal telephone taps does not
erode the reasonable expectation of privacy in a
telephone call.136

135. Formal Op. 99-413, at n.19.
136. Id.
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Social media embrace the most dubious characteristics of
e-mail and cellular transmissions. Their semi-public nature,
networking among unvetted friends, evolving privacy terms
and settings, and the endless possibility of republication and
the impossible task of keeping a secret among hundreds of
one‟s closest confidants online, makes this form of
communication unreasonable to preserve confidential
exchanges of information with clients. And since this form of
public media has not attained the sanctity of the telephone
booth,137 it throws doubt on privacy claims that might be
asserted by targets of undercover defense investigation.
Again, Opinion 01-422 suggested two areas where secret
recording of a client‟s phone conversation would not be
problematic: (1) “where the lawyer has no reason to believe the
client might object”; (2) “where exceptional circumstances
exist.”138 The second exception could be triggered in cases
where the lawyer thinks the client might commit a crime
“likely” to result in “imminent death or substantial bodily
harm.”139 This would also open the door to an ethical quandary
surrounding those instances where a lawyer has learned from
the client‟s profile that she has admitted responsibility for a
crime attributed to an innocent third party, who was being
wrongfully prosecuted for it.140 These cases typically begin
where the client has confessed to her attorney that she
137. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“The
Government‟s activities in electronically listening to and recording the
petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while
using the telephone booth and thus constituted a „search and seizure‟ within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the electronic device
employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the
booth can have no constitutional significance.”).
138. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‟l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-422,
at 7 (2001).
139. MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2009) (“A lawyer may
reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary: (1) to prevent reasonably certain death
or substantial bodily harm”).
140. See generally Colin Miller, Ordeal By Innocence: Why There Should
Be a Wrongful Incarceration-Execution Exception to Attorney-Client
Confidentiality, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 391 (2008); Ken Strutin,
Wrongful Conviction and Attorney-Client Confidentiality, LLRX.COM (Jan. 9,
2010), http://www.llrx.com/features/wrongfulconvictionconfidentiality.htm.
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committed the crime that someone is being charged with in the
course of confidential meetings. However, if a lawyer directly or
discretely examined a client‟s social media and unearthed this
information without the client‟s knowledge, another layer of
conflict is created.
ABA Opinion 01-422 lays the groundwork for a
nonconsensual contact through social media for “legitimate”
and “necessary” activities associated with the right to present a
defense. And it illustrates some of the potential pitfalls
awaiting incautious counsel gathering evidence undercover. On
the other hand there are compelling constitutional imperatives
that demand an attorney investigate social media in order to
prepare and present a defense.141 The foundations for these
requirements can be found in the measurement of effective
assistance of counsel and the use of technology.
In Gill v. State,142 a Missouri man had been convicted of
first-degree murder and sentenced to death. A key issue on his
appeal was the failure of his attorney to review the contents of
the victim‟s computer. During the penalty phase of the trial,
the prosecution introduced evidence of the victim‟s good
character. Before trial and in the course of discovery, a report
had been found in defendant‟s car detailing the contents of the
victim‟s computer,143 including lists of file names, folders, and
instant messages. Neither defense counsel interviewed the
detective who prepared the report or flagged any issues other
than inquiring of the prosecutor if there was any incriminating
or exculpatory information.144

141. See Ken Strutin, Hiding in Plain Sight: Evidence on Social
Networking Sites, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 10, 2009, at 5 [hereinafter Hiding in Plain
Sight].
142. 300 S.W.3d 225 (Mo. 2009).
143. Id. at 228 n.2 (“The victim‟s computer was relevant to the
investigation and prosecution of the crime because, after the murder, Gill and
his co-defendant, Justin Brown, used the computer to transfer $55,000 from
one of the victim‟s accounts to an ATM-accessible account so that they could
access the money.”).
144. Id. at 228 (“The prosecutor assured defense counsel that there was
nothing on the computer that he planned to use in the case or that implicated
another potential defendant. Relying on the prosecutor‟s assertions, defense
counsel decided to focus their attention away from the computer's contents.”).
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At a post-penalty hearing, the detective who prepared the
report testified that “he knew there was pornography on the
computer within a few days of creating the report. Before Gill‟s
trial, he looked at the transcript of the instant message
conversation about the 17-year-old daughter.”145 This
revelation was not discovered until the attorney for Gill‟s codefendant, Brown, spoke with the Lieutenant before his trial
and requested a copy of the hard drive for independent
analysis. The analyst testified at Gill‟s hearing that there were
instant messages and other files containing illicit sexual
content on the victim‟s computer. Due to this discovery, the
prosecution did not introduce the same good character evidence
in the co-defendant‟s penalty phase, thus making the
information irrelevant. Brown was eventually sentenced to life
in prison.146
On appeal of Gill‟s case, the court first dispensed with the
Brady violation claim. The defense had a copy of the report
that would have led to uncovering this information. The
defense‟s failure to recognize it did not render the information
undisclosed.147 More importantly, defendant‟s second claim was
that defense counsel should have identified the pornography
evidence on the victim‟s computer and used it in the penalty
phase to preclude the prosecution from introducing the good
character evidence or to rebut it. On this point, the appellate
court agreed:
By failing to discover those files on the
victim‟s computer, Gill‟s counsel‟s performance
was deficient. A reasonably competent attorney
would have carefully reviewed the report
provided by the State and recognized file names
like
“a_slutty18girl_w38c”
and
“sweet_tasting_slute” as evidence of sexually
explicit material on the computer. A reasonably
competent attorney would have conducted

145. Id. at 229.
146. Id. at 230-31.
147. Id. at 231.
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further investigation as to the contents of the
computer and discovered the child pornography
images, bestiality content, and sexually explicit
instant message conversations about the 17-yearold daughter. Then, a reasonably competent
attorney would have rebutted the State‟s
character evidence at the penalty phase.148
Additionally, the court held that Gill‟s attorneys should
have interviewed the police investigator who prepared the
report. The investigator was on the state‟s witness list and was
the first to examine the victim‟s computer. Based on the leads
in the report, a discussion with the Lieutenant would have
unearthed all the details of the pornography on the victim‟s
machine that would have proved invaluable at the sentencing
phase of the trial.
The essence of the Gill decision was that valuable and
necessary information about a victim was available from her
computer, and that information had been made known to
defense counsel, who did not act on it. This scenario has much
in common with social media investigations. First, if a
complainant or prosecution witness has posted exculpatory,
impeaching, or self-incriminating information online, and the
government knows about it, then it ought to be disclosed. And
the defense should have the opportunity to view it
independently. Facebook or MySpace are fundamentally
another hard drive, a remote site where people store
information similar to their home computer—actually it is
duplicative in many instances since the content originates from
a personal data device, which presumably stores a copy. Since
the right to counsel compels a defendant‟s lawyer to pursue
witness computer records revealed through discovery, specific
motions grounded on Brady and Jencks and statutory
disclosure rights should be considered for potential social
networking evidence.
Social media has become the new “mass observer,” and in

148. Id. at 233.
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terms of discovery, a ready recorder of spontaneous events.149
The defense attorney for a former Illinois police officer, accused
of shooting another man in a Pontoon Beach bar parking lot
and charged with aggravated battery with a firearm, filed a
motion asking to subpoena Facebook for the identity of
witnesses at the scene.150 “The motion seeks disclosure from
Facebook of 23 individual user profiles and the actions of a
Facebook group called „Jeff Bladdick is a bulletproof badass‟
going back to the day before the Nov. 9, 2008 incident.”151 The
attorney learned about the Facebook group from an anonymous
source. In support of his motion, counsel marshaled familiar
arguments: “[H]is client‟s constitutional rights fall within
exceptions of the 2000 Electronic Communications Privacy Act
and said that law enforcement regularly accesses the same
records for its own investigations.”152 This evidence was
essential to mounting a self-defense argument.153 Facebook
responded by pointing to the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act, which prevented it from complying. In addition,
the company claimed it would be technologically overwhelming
to locate twenty-three profiles out of three-hundred and fifty
million.154 The motion, which appears to have been the first of
its kind, was ultimately denied and the case ended in a plea
bargain.155 In other words, social media discovery by the
149. See generally Beth C. Boggs & Misty L. Edwards, Does What
Happens on Facebook Stay on Facebook? Discovery, Admissibility, Ethics, and
Social
Media,
98
ILL.
B.J.
366
(2010),
available
at
http://www6.lexisnexis.com/publisher/EndUser?Action
=UserDisplayFullDocument&orgId=574&topicId=138430011&docId=l:12188
65935&isRss=true.
150. See Joe Harris, Indicted Cop Challenges Facebook‟s Privacy Rights,
COURTHOUSE
NEWS
SERV.,
Feb.
18,
2010,
available
at
http://www.courthousenews.com /2010/02/18/24801.htm.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. (“Watkins [defendant's attorney] claims that Pour acted in selfdefense after he was attacked by two people in a Pontoon Beach bar parking
lot. Watkins says Pour pulled the gun from the back of his waistband during
the attack and fired, and mistakenly hit Bladdick [victim].”).
154. Id.
155. See Terry Hillig, Former St. Louis Officer Pleads Guilty in Shooting
Prosecutor Offers Lesser Charge in Altercation Outside Sports Bar in Pontoon
Beach in 2008, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Aug. 31, 2010 (“Watkins [defendant‟s
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defense is unguided by statute or ethical code. However, the
firmest grounds for making such discovery requests are the
right to counsel, compulsory process, and due process, and
reciprocal rights of investigation on par with the government.
When direct discovery offers no revelations and the
government does not possess social media information from
witnesses, it is defense counsel‟s duty to investigate. In light of
the massive participation in social media, it would be difficult
to argue that a reasonable lawyer could ignore a resource of
such magnitude.156 So the question becomes what are the risks
associated with investigating prosecution witnesses in the
semi-secluded online world of Facebook and MySpace?
The dilemma occurs when an attorney, in order to
effectively represent her client, tries to uncover impeaching
evidence on a witness computer using deception. In Office of
Lawyer Regulation v. Hurley,157 a man charged with sexually
assaulting a child and possession and exhibition of illicit
pornography hired Hurley to represent him. A key issue for the
defense was the accusation that the defendant had forced a
fifteen year-old child, S.B., to view pornography.158 However,
“Hurley believed that S.B. had an independent interest in, and
the ability to access, the materials . . . .”159 To uncover evidence
that S.B. had been lying, Hurley devised an investigation plan
that would allow him to examine the contents of S.B.‟s

attorney] sought at one point in Pour‟s criminal case to subpoena records of
22 people from the Facebook social networking website. They included police
officers who investigated the shooting, as well as other potential witnesses,
Watkins said. Attorneys for Facebook argued that federal law prevented
Facebook from disclosing the material, and Associate Judge James Hackett
agreed in a ruling in July. He said disclosure was barred by the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act.”)
156. See, e.g., Kang, supra note 1 (“Facebook is expected to say this week
that it has reached 500 million users, making it the biggest information
network on the Internet in a meteoric rise that has connected the world into
an online statehood of status updates, fan pages and picture exchanges.”).
157. 2008 Wisc. LEXIS 1181 (Feb. 5, 2008).
158. Id.
159. Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Hurley, No. 2007AP478-D (Wis. Feb.
11,
2009),
available
at
http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s69NewsDocumentOrder/FileUpload
500/6211/Office%20of%20Lawyer%20Regulation%20v.%20Hurley.pdf.
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computer. If S.B. had been alerted to this plan, there was a
grave risk of spoliation. Unlike Gill, there was some question
about the detective‟s interest in preserving this evidence, so no
direct formal discovery request was feasible.160
Hurley hired a private investigator and, after exploring the
options together, they devised an undercover operation. The
investigator sent a letter to S.B. advising him that he had been
selected to participate in a computer usage survey and, in
exchange for surrendering his computer for ninety days, he
would get a free laptop. Hurley provided guidelines for the
investigator that included making sure the mother was present
during his interactions with S.B. and the child would be
allowed to remove any contents from the computer he desired
before turning it over. The exchange was made according to
plan and the computer turned over to a forensic expert who
found illicit pornographic images.
In 2007, the Wisconsin Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR)
filed a complaint161 against Hurley for employing “dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation” in violation of the state‟s
Supreme Court Rules. The referee‟s report stated that the OLR
did not meet its burden of proof. Testimony presented at the
disciplinary hearing established that “there was a widespread
belief in the Wisconsin bar that the type of conduct engaged in
by Attorney Hurley was and is acceptable.”162 Even the
prosecutor behind the grievance affirmed that deceit was a
recognized practice in its undercover operations involving
nonlawyer investigators. The OLR director agreed that this
type of investigation practice was recognized for prosecutors,
but not private attorneys, although no authority had been cited
to support the differentiation.
Approving the referee‟s conclusion that Hurley did not
intend to break any rules or realize that his conduct might
have done so, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin quoted this
telling paragraph from the referee‟s report:

160. Id.
161. Based on allegations made by the district attorney‟s office involved
in the criminal case. Id. at 3.
162. Id. at 2.
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Mr. Hurley was faced with a very difficult
decision, with concurrent and conflicting
obligations: should he zealously defend his client,
fulfill his constitutional obligation to provide
effective assistance of counsel, and risk breaking
a vague ethical rule that, according to the record,
had never been enforced in this way? Or should
he knowingly fail to represent [the defendant] in
the manner to which he was entitled and hand
him persuasive grounds for appeal, an ethics
complaint, and a malpractice claim? The Sixth
Amendment seems to have broken the tie for Mr.
Hurley. A man‟s liberty was at stake. Mr. Hurley
had to choose, and he chose reasonably, in light
of his obligations and the vagueness of the
[supreme court rules].163
Gill and Hurley both speak to the fundamental importance
of right to counsel, which encompasses conducting a thorough
investigation. The contents of personal and home computing
devices have been extended firmly into the realm of third party
hosts, with their own rules of conduct. Inevitably, attorneys
will have to enter this virtual world to fulfill their
constitutional and ethical obligations, which brings us to the
paucity of authority that has treated this issue.
In 2005, the Oregon State Bar issued an opinion164
establishing guidelines for lawyers whose investigations took
them into the public lanes of the Information Highway.
Essentially, they distinguished visits to a public page of an
opponent‟s website and crossing the threshold by making
contact through that website. The scenario involved a civil case
in which the defendant had an Internet page accessible to
anyone, which the plaintiff‟s lawyer wanted to view. Oregon

163. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citing Hurley, 2008
Wisc. LEXIS 1181) (Referee‟s Report and Recommendation).
164. Oregon State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 2005-164
(2005), http://www.osbar.org/_docs/ethics/2005-164.pdf.
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RPC 4.2 cautioned against contacting a represented party, and
has been interpreted to apply to any mode of communication.
However, the purpose of the rule, to assure that represented
persons had the benefit of counsel when speaking with
opposing counsel, was not implicated by seeing the contents of
a site open to anyone. Any public matter published by an
adverse party, regardless of format, was fair game.
Moreover, the Legal Ethics Committee divorced the notion
of communication from viewing online: “A lawyer who reads
information posted for general public consumption simply is
not communicating with the represented owner of the Web
site.”165 In the footnote to this line, they make a very cogent
and significant observation: “For purposes of this opinion, a
Web site can be „public‟ even if an access fee or a subscription
fee is charged.”166 Access that implies registration brings it
within the ambit of social media sites. Of course, the terms of
service may vary, but the Oregon State Bar believed that
joining a site or registering alone was not problematic, it would
be the next step of communication that tips the balance.
Notably, it avoided directly addressing the pretexting question
in this same footnote.
The concern over engaging an opponent through her web
page was a possible violation of the attorney-client privilege. If
a lawyer knew that the person she was communicating with
online was represented, such contact would violate the Rule.167
But if the person was some low-level employee who might only
be a fact witness, then the communication would not raise any
eyebrows.168 And if the attorney contacted someone via the

165. Id.
166. Id.
167. This would also apply to situations where clients undertake to
speak with a represented party under the direction of or with the
involvement of counsel. See, e.g., Trumbull Cnty. Bar Ass‟n v. Makridis, 77
Ohio St. 3d 73 (1996) (attorney representing client in civil suit reprimanded
for overseeing a phone call by his client to opposing party to discuss client‟s
testimony, then taking the phone and speaking to the other represented
party directly).
168. Formal Op. 2005-164, at 3 (“Lawyer A could not use Internet
communications to invade the adverse party‟s lawyer client privilege. If, on
the other hand, Lawyer A does not invade the adverse party‟s privilege and
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website that she did not know was represented, but actually
was, there would still be no problem.169
So the complications would arise when a lawyer leaves the
public side of the web and joins a social media site for the
purposes of making contact with a witness. Getting in does not
seem to be a problem, according to the Oregon opinion, any
more than it would be for any Internet site that charged a fee
or required registration. Significantly, complainants and
witnesses in criminal prosecutions are largely unrepresented,
so a defense attorney might likely be in the position of someone
who did not “know” whether individuals in a case had counsel,
dispensing with Rule 4.2 concerns. The heart of the problem is
the one specifically not addressed by the Oregon Bar,
pretexting.
Philadelphia Bar Association Professional Guidance
Committee Opinion 2009-02, published in March 2009, is the
first known authority to directly address undercover
investigations in social media.170 It involved a civil case and the
deposition of an unrepresented eighteen-year-old witness who
was giving evidence favorable to the opposition. During
questioning she admitted having Facebook and MySpace
communicates only with a nonmanagerial employee who is merely a fact
witness, no violation would exist.”).
169. Id.
170. Later opinions on social networking and discovery have followed
the Philadelphia approach. See N.Y.S. Bar Ass‟n Comm. on Prof‟l Ethics, Op.
843
(2010),
available
at
http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Ethics_Opinions
&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=43208 (“A lawyer
who represents a client in a pending litigation, and who has access to the
Facebook or MySpace network used by another party in litigation, may access
and review the public social network pages of that party to search for
potential impeachment material. As long as the lawyer does not „friend‟ the
other party or direct a third person to do so, accessing the social network
pages of the party will not violate Rule 8.4 (prohibiting deceptive or
misleading conduct), Rule 4.1 (prohibiting false statements of fact or law), or
Rule 5.3(b)(1) (imposing responsibility on lawyers for unethical conduct by
nonlawyers acting at their direction).”); Ass‟n of the Bar of the City of N.Y.
Comm. on Prof‟l & Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 2010-2 (2010), available at
http://www.abcny.org/Ethics/eth2010.htm (“[A] lawyer may not use deception
to access information from a social networking webpage. Rather, a lawyer
should rely on the informal and formal discovery procedures sanctioned by
the ethical rules and case law to obtain relevant evidence.”).
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accounts. The Committee observed that these personal pages
limited access to certain individuals according to the account
holder‟s preference. The deposing lawyer had reason to think
that her pages might contain impeaching material. He did not
directly or openly ask the witness‟ permission to access the
pages but tried unsuccessfully to get to those pages without her
consent. From what he did see, the lawyer concluded that she
had a liberal policy of letting people have access to her profile.
His proposed investigation plan was as follows:
The inquirer proposes to ask a third person,
someone whose name the witness will not
recognize, to go to the Facebook and MySpace
websites, contact the witness and seek to “friend”
her, to obtain access to the information on the
pages. The third person would state only truthful
information, for example, his or her true name,
but would not reveal that he or she is affiliated
with the lawyer or the true purpose for which he
or she is seeking access, namely, to provide the
information posted on the pages to a lawyer for
possible use antagonistic to the witness. If the
witness allows access, the third person would
then provide the information posted on the pages
to the inquirer who would evaluate it for possible
use in the litigation.171
This is a classic pretexting operation, and one which has
been approved in cases involving civil rights, law enforcement,
and intellectual property infringement.172 On the surface, none
171. Phila.
Bar
Ass‟n,
Formal
Op.
2009-02
(2009),
http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/We
bServerResources/CMSResources/Opinion_2009-2.pdf.
172. See, e.g., N.Y.C. County Lawyer‟s Ass‟n, Formal Op. 737 (2007),
http://www.nycla.org/siteFiles/Publications/Publications519_0.pdf (“In New
York, while it is generally unethical for a non-government lawyer to
knowingly utilize and/or supervise an investigator who will employ
dissemblance in an investigation, we conclude that it is ethically permissible
in a small number of exceptional circumstances where the dissemblance by
investigators is limited to identity and purpose and involves otherwise lawful
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of the recognized exceptions applied to this civil action, so the
Philadelphia Committee‟s Opinion focused principally on
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(c)
concerning “dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”
They believed that the proposed surreptitious investigation
would violate this rule:
It omits a highly material fact, namely, that the
third party who asks to be allowed access to the
witness‟s pages is doing so only because he or she
is intent on obtaining information and sharing it
with a lawyer for use in a lawsuit to impeach the
testimony of the witness. The omission would
purposefully conceal that fact from the witness
for the purpose of inducing the witness to allow
access, when she may not do so if she knew the
third person was associated with the inquirer
and the true purpose of the access was to obtain
information for the purpose of impeaching her
testimony.173
activity undertaken solely for the purpose of gathering evidence. Even in
these cases, a lawyer supervising investigators who dissemble would be
acting unethically unless (i) either (a) the investigation is of a violation of
civil rights or intellectual property rights and the lawyer believes in good
faith that such violation is taking place or will take place imminently or (b)
the dissemblance is expressly authorized by law; and (ii) the evidence sought
is not reasonably and readily available through other lawful means; and (iii)
the lawyer‟s conduct and the investigator‟s conduct that the lawyer is
supervising do not otherwise violate the New York Lawyer‟s Code of
Professional Responsibility (the „Code‟) or applicable law; and (iv) the
dissemblance does not unlawfully or unethically violate the rights of third
parties. These conditions are narrow. Attorneys must be cautious in applying
them to different situations. In most cases, the ethical bounds of permissible
conduct will be limited to situations involving the virtual necessity of nonattorney investigator(s) posing as an ordinary consumer(s) engaged in an
otherwise lawful transaction in order to obtain basic information not
otherwise available. This opinion does not address the separate question of
direction of investigations by government lawyers supervising law
enforcement personnel where additional considerations, statutory duties and
precedents may be relevant. This opinion also does not address whether a
lawyer is ever permitted to make dissembling statements directly himself or
herself.”). See generally Hiding in Plain Sight, supra note 141, at 5.
173. Formal Op. 2009-02, at 3.
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Concealment of identity and purpose was impermissible in
this context. And the witness‟s risky policy of accepting
“Friends” with little information did not validate the lawyer‟s,
or investigator‟s, approach. The privacy policy of the witness
did not factor into the analysis of whether the deceit was
permissible under the Code. In other words, there was no way
to sanitize the conduct of any person who might have access
the witness‟ page at the direction of the attorney, regardless of
the information they provided.174 The Committee distinguished
this situation from a day in the life video that might record an
unsuspecting plaintiff out in “public” to impeach her claims,
because information on social networking sites was intended to
be kept private.175
The Committee went on to consider the limitations of
deception in legal investigation, criminal and civil, and
exceptions to further societal good, such as uncovering
unlawful and discriminatory behavior.176 Without addressing
the blanket prohibition of covert investigation recognized by
some states or the exceptions endorsed in others, the
Committee found that in this scenario it was unethical.177
This opinion was rendered in a bubble, and peremptorily

174. Id. at 4 (“The Committee believes that in addition to violating Rule
8.4(c), the proposed conduct constitutes the making of a false statement of
material fact to the witness and therefore violates Rule 4.1 as well.”).
175. Id. at 3.
176. Id. at 4-6.
177. The Committee also declined to answer the question about the
admissibility of social media evidence obtained through pretexting. This is
another important problem that has to be resolved in tandem with the ethics
and legitimacy of the investigative technique; otherwise the evidence may be
precluded or suppressed. See Berman et al., supra note 63, at 5 (analyzes
issues associated with introducing evidence from second generation web
sources such as social networking). See generally Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins.
Co., 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. 2007) (discusses basic tenets of admitting
electronic or digital evidence analyzing the difficulties in establishing
relevancy, authenticity, overcoming hearsay, best evidence, and prejudice
versus probity arguments); Paul W. Grimm et al., Back to the Future:
Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Co. and New Findings on the
Admissibility of Electronically Stored Information, 42 AKRON L. REV. 357, 367
(2009) (update on the evidentiary foundation requirements for electronic
evidence first discussed in the Lorraine decision, including: e-mail, web sites,
text messages, and computer generated evidence).
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closed off a huge and vital area of discovery. The trouble lies in
the concepts of privacy and purpose, and the thin veil that can
deflect legitimate and necessary covert investigations. As one
scholar has observed, it was unfair to exempt government law
enforcement, civil rights and intellectual property from the bar
on undercover work without a critical rationale behind these
choices.178 Moreover, he suggested a “neutral” test that might
be applied more fairly:
[T]he search should be for neutral principles that
reasonably balance the benefits and risks of such
technology. These neutral principles should focus
less on whether the lawyer/investigator is
operating anonymously or with a pseudonym.
Rather, they should concentrate more on the
intrusiveness of the technique and the risk that
confidential or privileged information may be
improperly revealed in the process.179
A reasonable guideline for criminal cases is the “societal
good” criterion, i.e., the fair administration of justice. The goal
would be to prevent or address current problems in the system
that result in wrongful convictions. These should be addressed
at the earliest stages of a case to preserve the presumption of
innocence and due process of law.
Conclusion
Today, hundreds of millions of people are sharing
information, communicating, and archiving the details of their
lives online. Through canyons of Internet bandwidth, an
increasingly complex forum of overlapping voices are being
created, preserved and transmitted worldwide. Thirty years

178. See Steven C. Bennett, Ethics of “Pretexting” in a Cyber World, 41
MCGEORGE L. REV. 271, 279 (2010) (“Ethics authorities should not arbitrarily
limit the benefits of such information or favor certain categories of lawyers
over others.”).
179. Id. (emphasis added).
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ago, the Supreme Court recognized that most people were
getting their information about court proceedings from
electronic and print media.180 Now, our society is in the midst
of a personal data revolution in which new enclaves of data and
individual metrics are being created on a monumental scale.181
Social networking will surpass diaries, photo albums, and
paper correspondence; it will supersede e-mail and telephonic
communication; it will even trump television, radio, and
newspapers as the principal source of news and personal
information.182
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and the other social media
gained prominence rapidly. Their power is still unmeasured
and the rules for their uses unclear. In a sense, social
networking is the Promethean fire of the Information Age.
Without guidance, it spells mischief for the lawyers who must
use it to represent their clients. The question has changed from
how to find information about witnesses and parties online, to
how to find information within ethical and legal boundaries
that will be in existence when the case comes to trial.183
180. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572
(1980) (“With the press, cinema, and electronic media now supplying the
representations or reality of the real life drama once available only in the
courtroom, attendance at court is no longer a widespread pastime.”).
181. See Richard Macmanus, The Coming Data Explosion, N.Y. TIMES,
May
31,
2010,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/external/readwriteweb/2010/05/31/31readwritewebthe-coming-data-explosion-13154.html (“One of the key aspects of the
emerging Internet of Things—where real-world objects are connected to the
Internet—is the massive amount of new data on the Web that will result. As
more and more „things‟ in the world are connected to the Internet, it follows
that more data will be uploaded to and downloaded from the cloud. And this
is in addition to the burgeoning amount of user-generated content—which
has increased 15-fold over the past few years, according to a presentation
that Google VP Marissa Mayer made last August at Xerox PARC. Mayer said
during her presentation that this „data explosion is bigger than Moore‟s
law.‟”).
182. See, e.g., Wayne, supra note 16. See generally Internet Gains on
Television as Public‟s Main News Source, PEW RES. CENTER (Jan. 4, 2011),
http://people-press.org/report/689/.
183. See generally Mark A. Berman, The Ethics of Social Networking
Discovery, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 2, 2010, at 5 (“Just like conducting Westlaw or
Lexis due diligence on an individual, social networking sites need to be
reviewed as part of discovery protocol when seeking to obtain relevant
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The big problem is that the standards of privacy and
criminal behavior are being defined in large part by the terms
of service and technology options set by social networking
providers. The Drew Lori case taught us that a breach of
contract, such as a terms of service contract, was unlikely to
sustain a violation of federal criminal law.184 Privatizing
criminal law or definitions of privacy are problematic and
unconstitutional. It would be an abdication of the legislative
function to permit private Internet-based services to define
online privacy or criminalize behavior vaguely described in
browser- and clip-wrap contracts. The legislatures have to
update the definitions of criminal laws related to electronic
media in the discovery and penal statutes. Moreover, the courts
must be adept and up to date on the latest technology
innovations that might influence the interpretation of legal and
ethical rules for attorney conduct in this virtual environment
as in other developing areas.185
Social networking is a convergence technology, combining
communication
media
and
information
storage
in
unprecedented ways. A new unified approach is necessary to
administer the application of criminal law, evidentiary rules,
and ethical constraints in this context. As courts and counsel

information concerning a person or entity.”); Thomas G. Frongillo & Daniel
K. Gelb, It‟s Time to Level the Playing Field—The Defense‟s Use of Evidence
from Social Networking Sites, CHAMPION, Aug. 2010, at 14 (“Comprehensive
discovery of evidence from social networks is now imperative. The
prosecution obtained an early lead. It‟s time for the defense to level the
playing field and aggressively use this rich source of information at trial.”).
184. See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 452 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
185. See, e.g., Committee on the Development of the Third Edition of the
Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, COMM. ON SCI., TECH. & L.,
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/stl/development_manual/index.htm
(last visited Oct. 10, 2010) (“At the request of the Federal Judicial Center
(FJC), and in collaboration with the FJC, [the Committee on Science,
Technology, and Law] will develop the third edition of the Reference Manual
on Scientific Evidence. The Reference Manual assists judges in managing
cases involving complex scientific and technical evidence by describing the
basic tenets of key scientific fields from which legal evidence is typically
derived and providing examples of cases in which that evidence has been
used. The development of the third edition will follow the basic structure of
the current edition, but will include, in addition to updating, new topics and
annotated case citations.”).

61

2011] ETHICAL & CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARIES

289

wend their way through the thickets, a fundamental
constitutional analysis will serve as the best guidepost. The
right to present a defense and reciprocal discovery are well
established and supported by Supreme Court precedent. Until
the nuances of cyber criminal investigations are worked out,
judges should maintain the balance of rights by leveling the
playing field between prosecutors and defense. If the
government is permitted access to Facebook or Twitter, if the
prosecution can introduce YouTube videos and iPhone
messages, then due process demands the same rights for the
defense. For law enforcement, social media are among the first
avenues to be investigated undercover, and there are no logical
reasons why the defense should have to exhaust all other
options before following the same path. In this area, the delete
button and risk of spoliation of digital media make early entry
into a witness social profile an unacknowledged imperative for
the defense as much as for the prosecution.
We have entered a new part of the Information Age, the
Social Media Era.186 It is the time of quantum computing and
the specter of nearly a billion personal profiles online.
Countries around the world are evolving into societies that
permit unbounded sharing and displaying of personal
multimedia experiences. To paraphrase Andy Warhol, everyone
wants their 15 gigabytes of fame. And all fame has its price.
The cost of this freedom is a qualified privacy, a cloverleaf
intersection weaving electronic human activities with the law,
and the unveiling of new avenues of investigation. The best
“path forward” for discovery in social space is to recognize that
it is unprecedented and construct rules that remain faithful to
the constitutional and ethical principles that have served
society in the physical world. Due process and the fair
186. Online communities are really no different than the unregulated
ancient Roman bathhouses, where people came together to talk, relax and
entertain themselves, while baring all. And bandwidth, like currents of
water, is the well that draws people together. See JAMES SALZMAN, THIRST: A
SHORT
HISTORY
OF
DRINKING
WATER
(2005),
available
at
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2043&context
=faculty_scholarship (“The main reason for construction of the aqueducts was
not hygienic but social. Bath houses were an integral part of Roman society
and they required large volumes of water.”).
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administration of justice dictate that there ought to be an equal
right of access and use of virtual evidence regardless of changes
in the mechanics of human communication and interaction.
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